比例大概要分摊2；500万美元，虽然这项损失不会反应在我们的帐上，但确实已对我们的透视盈余造成影响）。
In last year's report I told you that I hoped that our super…cat business would over time achieve a 10％ profit margin。 But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely to be 〃either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable。〃 Instead； both 1991 and 1992 have e in close to a break…even level。 Nonetheless； I see these results as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this business。
在去年的年报中，我曾告诉各位我们希望能从霹雳猫保险这类业务获得10％的利润空间，但我还是要提醒各位在某些特定的年度中，有可能一下子大赚或是一下子大亏，然而1991年与1992年倒是维持在损益两平的边缘，不过我还是认为这样的结果有点异常，同时我还是坚持在这行获利可能大好大坏的预测。
Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super…cat policies。 Generally； they are activated only when two things happen。 First； the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount … that's the policyholder's 〃retention〃 … from a catastrophe； and second； industry…wide insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum level； which usually is 3 billion or more。 In most cases； the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area； such as a portion of the U。S。； the entire U。S。； or everywhere other than the U。S。 Also； many policies are not activated by the first super…cat that meets the policy terms； but instead cover only a 〃second…event〃 or even a third… or fourth…event。 Finally； some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type； such as an earthquake。 Our exposures are large： We have one policy that calls for us to pay 100 million to the policyholder if a specified catastrophe occurs。 （Now you know why I suffer eyestrain： from watching The Weather Channel。）
我还是苦口婆心再提醒各位霹雳猫保单的特点，通常只有在两种情况发生时，理赔才会生效，首先受我们保护的保险或再保公司的损失必须超过一定金额…也就是保户的自留保额部份；第二整个保险业界的损失也必须超过一定的上限，比如说30亿美元以上或甚至更多。在大部分的状况之下，我们发行的保单只包含特定地区，像是美国一部份州、或是全美国或是除了美国的以外地区，另外有许多保单也不是在第一次大型灾害发生后就须理赔，有的只保第二次或第三次甚至是第四次大灾害，最后一点有些保单只保特定种类的灾害，比如说是地震，我们暴露的风险相当的大，我们有一张保单若是发生保单上指定的特定灾害发生的话，就必须给予保户1亿美元的理赔，（现在你应该知道我常常盯着气象频道盯到眼睛酸的原因了吧）。
Currently； Berkshire is second in the U。S。 property…casualty industry in net worth （the leader being State Farm； which neither buys nor sells reinsurance）。 Therefore； we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other pany。 We have the appetite as well： As Berkshire's net worth and earnings grow； our willingness to write business increases also。 But let me add that means good business。 The saying； 〃a fool and his money are soon invited everywhere；〃 applies in spades in reinsurance； and we actually reject more than 98％ of the business we are offered。 Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength： Ajit Jain； who runs our reinsurance operation； is simply the best in this business。 In bination； these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the super…cat business so long as prices are appropriate。
现在Berkshire是全美国净值第二大的产业意外险公司（排名第一的是州农保险，不过他们并不从事再保业务），因此我们绝对有能力也有兴趣去承担别的保险公司无法承担的风险，随着Berkshire的净值与获利能力继续成长，我们接受保单的意愿也跟着增加，但是我必须强调只有好的生意我们才愿意接，有人说：笨的有钱人特别好骗，我想这句话也适用在再保险之上，事实上我们平均我们拒绝98％以上上门的保单请求，我们挑选客户的能力跟我们本身的财务实力相当， Ajit Jain负责经营我们的再保业务，堪称业界的翘楚，两者结合使得我们的竞争力确保我们可以在霹雳猫保险业界继续成为主要的参与者，只要保费价格合理的话。
What constitutes an appropriate price； of course； is difficult to determine。 Catastrophe insurers can't simply extrapolate past experience。 If there is truly 〃global warming；〃 for example； the odds would shift； since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns。 Furthermore； in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U。S。 coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes； the number one creator of super…cats。 A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now。
当然何谓合理的价格实在是很难去界定，灾害保险业者实在是很难依据过去的经验来预估未来，例如若是全球温室效应确实存在的话，意外变量一定会增多，只要大气状况有任何些微的转变就有可能造成气象形态的巨幅波动，更有甚者，最近几年美国海岸地区人口爆炸性成长，使得这些地区的被保标的特别容易受到飓风的侵袭，而飓风正是超级意外最常发生的第一名，现在一次飓风所发生的损失可能是二十年前的十倍以上。
Occasionally； also； the unthinkable happens。 Who would have guessed； for example； that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston； S。C。？ （It struck in 1886； registered an estimated 6。6 on the Richter scale； and caused 60 deaths。） And who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid； Missouri； which suffered an estimated 8。7 shocker in 1812。 By parison； the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7。1 … and remember that each one…point Richter increase represents a ten…fold increase in strength。 Someday； a U。S。 earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers。
而且有时还会有意想不到的事情发生，比如说谁会想到Charleston地区竟然会发生大地震（它在1886年发生，芮氏规模6。6，造成60个人死亡），又有谁知道美国史上最严重的地震是1812年发生在密苏里州估计规模8。7的那次地震，比较起来1989年发生在旧金山的大地震，规模只有7。1，大家要知道每增加0。1级代表其释放的力量就要增加10倍，哪一天要是加州发生大地震的话，将会对所有保险业者造成难以估计的损失。
When viewing our quarterly figures； you should understand that our accounting for super…cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums。 Rather than recording our super…cat premiums on a pro…rata basis over the life of a given policy； we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires。 We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super…cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year。 It is then that weather tends to kick up： Of the ten largest insured losses in U。S。 history； nine occurred in the last half of the year。 In addition； policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely； by their very terms； to cause us losses until late in the year。
当各位在检视我们每季的数字时，大家一定要知道我们霹雳猫保险的会计原则与一般保险有些许的不同，没有将霹雳猫的保费收入按保单发行期间平均分摊认列，我们必须等到整个保单期间结束或是损失发生后才全部一次认列，我们之所以采取这样保守的做法，原因在于霹雳猫保单在年度截止之前特别容易发生意情，尤其是天气状况更是如此，在历史上前十大意外灾害中，有九件是发生在下半年，此外由于许多保单在第一次重大灾害发生时，并不理赔，所以若真的发生损失的话，通常会是在下半年。
The bottom…line effect of our accounting procedure for super…cats is this： Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year； but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter。
对于霹雳猫保险我们的会计原则底限就是，钜额的损失可能会发生在任何一季，但钜额的获利只有在每年的第四季才有可能出现。
As I've told you in each of the last few years； what counts in our insurance business is 〃the cost of funds developed from insurance；〃 or in the vernacular； 〃the cost of float。〃 Float … which we generate in exceptional amounts … is the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss。
就像是前几年向各位提过的，真正重要的是我们从保险业所取得的资金，其资金成本到底是多少，套句专业术语，就是浮存金成本，浮存金…系指我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The