除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967。
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：
（1） （2） Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long…Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1991 119。59 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％ 1992 108。96 2；290。4 4。76％ 7。39％
Last year； our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U。S。 Government on its newly…issued long…term bonds。 This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government's rate； and often we have done so by a wide margin。 （If； on average； we didn't beat the Government's rate； there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business。）
去年我们保险营运所产生的资金成本还是一样低于美国政府当年所新发行的公债利率，意思是说在过去26年的保险事业经营中，我们有21年是远胜于政府公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，（那天要是我们平均的资金成本高于政府公债的利率的话，我们实在就没有理由继续留在保险业了）。
In 1992； as in previous years； National Indemnity's mercial auto and general liability business； led by Don Wurster； and our homestate operation； led by Rod Eldred； made excellent contributions to our low cost of float。 Indeed； both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year； thereby generating float at a less…than…zero cost。 The bulk of our float； meanwhile； es from large transactions developed by Ajit。 His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993。
1992年，如同以往年度，由Don Wurster领导的国家产物意外险公司所经营的汽车与一般责任保险以及Rod Eldred领导的Homestate营运，对于我们取得低廉的资金有相当的贡献，事实上，在去年这两家公司都有承保获利，也就是说所产生的保险浮存金的资金成本都是低于零，当然我们也有一大笔的浮存金是来自于Ajit所开发出来的大型案件，展望1993年这方面所贡献的保费收入还会增加。
Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business； which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to e。 The industry is huge； in certain sectors we can pete world…wide； and Berkshire possesses an important petitive advantage。 We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business； either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity。
查理跟我还是相当喜爱保险业，这也是我们预期未来十年盈余的主要来源，这个产业规模够大，在某些类别我们可以与全世界业者竞争，同时Berkshire在这方面也拥有特殊的竞争力，我们会继续寻找在这行增加参与的机会，不管是间接透过GEICO、或是以取得中央州立保险公司的股权那样直接参与。
mon Stock Investments股票投资
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
12/31/92 Shares pany Cost Market （000s omitted）
3；000；000 93；400；000 16；196；700 34；250；000 4；350；000 24；000；000 38；335；000 1；727；765 6；358；418
Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 （〃Freddie Mac〃） GEICO Corp General Dynamics Corp The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
517；500 1；023；920 414；257 45；713 312；438 600；000 333；019 9；731 380；983
1；523；500 3；911；125 783；515 2；226；250 450；769 1；365；000 299；581 396；954 485；624
Leaving aside splits； the number of shares we held in these panies changed during 1992 in only four cases： We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo； we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac； and we established a new holding in General Dynamics。 We like to buy。
除了股票分割，我们1992年在这些主要投资的持股只有四项变动，我们小幅增加Guinness与Wells Fargo的持股，另外将Freddie Mac的持股增加一倍，至于通用动力则是全新增加的投资。
Selling； however； is a different story。 There； our pace of activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel。 With no T。V。 in his room； he faced an evening of boredom。 But his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled 〃Things to do in Podunk。〃 Opening it； he found just a single sentence： 〃You're doing it。〃
我们很喜欢买股票，不过卖股票又是另外一回事，就这点我们的步伐就像是一个旅行家发现自己身处于只有一个小旅馆的小镇上，房间里没有电视，面对慢慢无聊的长夜，突然间他很兴奋地发现桌上有一本书名为「在本小镇可以做的事」，只是当他翻开书后，里面却只有短短的一句话：「那就是你现在在做的这件事」。
We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase。 I had paid little attention to the pany until last summer； when it announced it would repurchase about 30％ of its shares by way of a Dutch tender。 Seeing an arbitrage opportunity； I began buying the stock for Berkshire； expecting to tender our holdings for a small profit。 We've made the same sort of mitment perhaps a half…dozen times in the last few years； reaping decent rates of return for the short periods our money has been tied up。
我们很高兴能买到通用动力，之前我并未特别留意这家公司，直到去年夏天该公司宣布买回流通在外30％的股权，看到这样难得的套利机会，我开始替Berkshire买进这家公司的股票，预期透过公司买回股份可以小赚一笔，在过去几年中，我们曾经做了好几次类似这样的交易，让短期投入的资金获得相当丰厚的报酬。
But then I began studying the pany and the acplishments of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO。 And what I saw made my eyes pop： Bill had a clearly articulated and rational strategy； he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in carrying it out； and the results were truly remarkable。
之后我开始研究这家公司，以及Bill Anders在担任该公司CEO短短期间所做的事，没想到让我眼睛一亮，Bill有一套精心设计的策略，他相当专注于把这项策略付诸实行，而最后所得到的成果也相当不错。
In short order； I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided that Berkshire should bee a long…term investor with Bill。 We were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock。 In a one…month period； we were able to purchase 14％ of the General Dynamics shares that remained outstanding after the tender was pleted。
过不了多久，我就把短期套利的念头拋开，决定Berkshire应该成为Bill的长期投资者，而受惠于买回股份的消息，成交量扩大，我们得以买进大量的部位，在短短一个月期间，我们一口气买进通用动力14％的股份，这是在扣除该公司本身买回的股份之后的比例。
Our equity…investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago； when we said in the 1977 annual report： 〃We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety。 We want the business to be one （a） that we can understand； （b） with favorable long…term prospects； （c） operated by honest and petent people； and （d） available at a very attractive price。〃 We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed： Because of both market conditions and our size； we now substitute 〃an attractive price〃 for 〃a very attractive price。〃
我们在股权投资的策略跟15年前1977年度报告的那套一样，并没有多大的变化，在选择股票投资所采用的评估方式与买下一整家企业的情况没什么两样，我们希望投资的对象（1）是我们所了解的（2）具有长期的远景（3）由才德兼具的人所经营（4）非常吸引人的合理价格。但考量目前市场的情况与公司的资金规模，我们现在决定将〃非常吸引人的价格〃改成〃吸引人的价格〃。
But how； you will ask； does one decide what's 〃attra