eless realized a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to these shares。
我曾告诉过各位，我们预估这些已依估计税率调整过的未分配盈余至少可以为Berkshire创造出同等的实质价值，而到目前为止，其真正的结果甚至超乎我们的预期，举例来说，我们在1986年以每股172。5美元的价格买进300万股资本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我们以每股630美元的价格处分了其中的三分之一，在支付35％的资本利得税后，我们实现2。97亿美元的税后盈余，相对地，在我们持有这些股份的八年期间，经由这些股份资本城公司分配给我们的透视盈余在扣除估计14％的所得税之后，只有1。52亿美元，换句话说，透过出售这些股份，所获取的利益，即便在扣除较高的所得税负之后，还是比原先透过持股所分配到的盈余还要高出许多。
We expect such pleasant outes to recur often in the future and therefore believe our look…through earnings to be a conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings。
而我们也预期这样的情况在未来还会持续发生，因此我们相信Berkshire所计算的透视盈余，算是相当保守的表达方式。
Taxes税负
As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes； Berkshire is a substantial payer of federal ine taxes。 In aggregate； we will pay 1993 federal ine taxes of 390 million； about 200 million of that attributable to operating earnings and 190 million to realized capital gains。 Furthermore； our share of the 1993 federal and foreign ine taxes paid by our investees is well over 400 million； a figure you don't see on our financial statements but that is nonetheless real。 Directly and indirectly； Berkshire's 1993 federal ine tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1％ of the total paid last year by all American corporations。
就像是刚刚提到的资本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以说是联邦政府的缴税大户，总计在1993年，我们总共缴了3。9亿美元的所得税，其中2亿属于本业获利，另外1。9亿则源自于资本利得，此外我们的被投资公司另外向联邦政府与国外政府又缴交了超过4亿美元的所得税，这是你在本公司的财务报表上看不到，但却又确实存在的，直接再加上间接合计，Berkshire占去年所有美国企业缴给联邦政府所得税总额的1。5％。
Speaking for our own shares； Charlie and I have absolutely no plaint about these taxes。 We know we work in a market…based economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit to society。 Taxation should； and does； partially redress this inequity。 But we still remain extraordinarily well…treated。
对于这个比例，查理跟我本人一点怨言也没有，我们知道我们是在一个市场导向的经济社会，我们努力所收到的报酬，其比例甚至比一些对这个社会有更多贡献的人还要多，透过租税政策，多多少少可以降低这种不合理性，不过即便是如此，我们还是认为自己受到特别优厚的待遇。
Berkshire and its shareholders； in bination； would pay a much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or 〃S〃 corporation； two structures often used for business activities。 For a variety of reasons； that's not feasible for Berkshire to do。 However； the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated … though far from eliminated … by our strategy of investing for the long term。 Charlie and I would follow a buy…and…hold policy even if we ran a tax…exempt institution。 We think it the soundest way to invest； and it also goes down the grain of our personalities。 A third reason to favor this policy； however； is the fact that taxes are due only when gains are realized。
虽然Berkshire若是以合伙或S型企业的形式来经营，（在美国许多商业活动确实是以这两种形态在运作），Berkshire跟其所有的股东，总的来说可以大大减少所需负担的税负，但基于许多理由，那样的做法并不适合Berkshire的运作，所幸我们以企业形态运作的模式所受到的租税惩罚，因为我们采取长期投资的策略而稍稍减轻，虽然就算是证交所得免税，查理跟我还是会坚持遵照买进并持有的策略，这是我们认为最好的投资方式，同时也最符合我们的个人特质，当然第三个好处就是因为这样做可以使我们只有在实现资本利得时才需要缴税。
Through my favorite ic strip； Li'l Abner； I got a chance during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes； though I missed the lesson at the time。 Making his readers feel superior； Li'l Abner bungled happily； but moronically； through life in Dogpatch。 At one point he became infatuated with a New York temptress； Appassionatta Van Climax； but despaired of marrying her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires。 Dejected； Abner took his problem to Old Man Mose； the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch。 Said the sage： Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours （1； 2； 4； 8 。 。 。 。 1；048；576）。
经由我个人最喜爱的漫画短片，Li'l Abner，我有机会可以体会到延迟支付所得税的好处，虽然当时我没有好好地利用那次机会，为了让他的读者觉得自己很优越，Li'l Abner一直快乐地维持单身，直到他为纽约一位女演员Appassionatta深深地着迷，但由于她只对百万富翁有兴趣，因此一贫如洗的Abner可以说是一点希望都没有，在遭到拒绝之后，Abner跑去智能老人Mose那里请他指点迷津，结果这位圣贤对Abner说，很简单你只要能够将身上仅有的一块钱，复制20次，Appassionatta自然就会投入到你的怀抱（1；2；4；8；…。；1；048；576）。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse； dropping his dollar into a slot machine； and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor。 Meticulously following Mose's advice； Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double。 Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham。
我记得这段漫画的最后一段是Abner跑到一家旅馆，将他仅有的一块钱投入吃角子老虎中，结果竟然中了七星，一时之间奖金掉满地，没想到他老兄一丝不苟遵照Mose老人的旨意，只捡起了其中的两块钱之后，就出发去寻找下一次复制的机会，看到这里我便舍弃了Abner，并开始研读葛拉汉的理论。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru： Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions； he also forgot about taxes。 Had Abner been subject； say； to the 35％ federal tax rate that Berkshire pays； and had he managed one double annually； he would after 20 years only have accumulated 22；370。 Indeed； had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a 35％ tax on each； he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the 1 million required to win Appassionatta。
Mose很显然地不配当他人的精神导师，除了低估Abner对于他的指示过于盲从的程度，他也忘了考虑到可能的税负，假设今天Abner也像Berkshire一样必须负担高达35％的联邦所得税的话，而且他每年只能成功地复制一次的话，就算连续20年都如他所愿，他也只能累积到22；370元，当然若是他能持之以恒地保持这样的记录的话，他则还须多等上七年半，才能累积到所需的100万以赢得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times？ In that case； he would have realized about 200 million pre…tax or； after paying a 70 million tax in the final year； about 130 million after…tax。 For that； Appassionatta would have crawled to Dogpatch。 Of course； with 27 1/2 years having passed； how Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on 130 million is another question。
然而要是Abner只将资金放在单一不变的投资之上，同时连续27年半都能保持每年倍数成长的记录的话，这样到最后，他在税前可以累积高达二亿美元的获利，或是在扣除7；000万美元的所得税之后，得到税后1亿3；000万美元的利益，届时可能会换做是Appassionatta爬着来求他了，当然等到27年后，一个坐拥1亿多美元的富翁会怎么看待年华老去的Appassionatta，则又是另外一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax…paying investors will realize a far； far greater sum from a single investment that pounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments pounding at the same rate。 But I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago。
这宗小故事告诉我们必须负担税负的投资人从每年固定以一个比率成长的单一投资上，可以获得比每年更换投资对象所得的多的多，即便是两者成长的幅度一样也是如此，不过我怀疑许多Berkshire的股东老早就已经知道这个道理了。
Insurance Operations保险事业营运
At this point in the report we've customarily provided you with a table showing the annual 〃bined ratio〃 of the insurance industry for the preceding decade。 This ratio pares total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） to revenue from premiums。 For many years； the ratio has been above 100； a level indicating an underwriting loss。 That is； the industry has taken in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during the year。
接下来到这里我们通常会准备一张表来说明保险业过去十多年来的综合比率，综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，多