ase a risky investment … one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury … if you believe that your gain； weighted for probabilities； considerably exceeds your loss； parably weighted； and if you can mit to a number of similar； but unrelated opportunities。 Most venture capitalists employ this strategy。 Should you choose to pursue this course； you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel； which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities； but will refuse to accept a single； huge bet。
当然，有些投资策略，例如我们从事多年的套利活动，就必须将风险分散，若是单一交易的风险过高，就比须将资源分散到几个各自独立的个案之上，如此一来，虽然每个个案都有可能导致损失或伤害，但只要你确信每个独立的个案经过机率的加权平均能够让你获致满意的报酬就行了，许多创业投资者用的就是这种方法，若是你也打算这样做的话，记得采取与赌场老板搞轮盘游戏同样的心态，那就是鼓励大家持续不断的下注，因为长期而言，机率对庄家有利，但千万要拒绝单一一次的大赌注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long…term owner of American industry。 That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases。 By periodically investing in an index fund； for example； the know…nothing investor can actually out…perform most investment professionals。 Paradoxically； when 〃dumb〃 money acknowledges its limitations； it ceases to be dumb。
另外一种需要分散风险的特殊情况是，当投资人并没有对任何单一产业有特别的熟悉，不过他却对美国整体产业前景有信心，则这类的投资人应该分散持有许多公司的股份，同时将投入的时点拉长，例如，透过定期投资指数基金，一个什么都不懂的投资人通常都能打败大部分的专业经理人，很奇怪的是，当愚昧的金钱了解到自己的极限之后，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand； if you are a know…something investor； able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly…priced panies that possess important long…term petitive advantages； conventional diversification makes no sense for you。 It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk。 I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices … the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk； along with the greatest profit potential。 In the words of the prophet Mae West： 〃Too much of a good thing can be wonderful。〃
另一方面，若是你是稍具常识的投资人，能够了解产业经济的话，应该就能够找出五到十家股价合理并享有长期竞争优势的公司，此时一般分散风险的理论对你来说就一点意义也没有，要是那样做反而会伤害到你的投资成果并增加你的风险，我实在不了解那些投资人为什么要把钱摆在他排名第20的股票上，而不是把钱集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同时风险最小，获利可能最大的投资之上，或许这就是先知梅西卫斯特所说的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance企业治理
At our annual meetings； someone usually asks 〃What happens to this place if you get hit by a truck？〃 I'm glad they are still asking the question in this form。 It won't be too long before the query bees： 〃What happens to this place if you don't get hit by a truck？〃
在年度的股东会上，有人常常会问︰「要是那天你不幸被车撞到，该怎么办？」我只能说很庆幸他们还是在问这样的问题，而不是「要是那天你不被车撞到，我们该怎么办？」。
Such questions； in any event； raise a reason for me to discuss corporate governance； a hot topic during the past year。 In general； I believe that directors have stiffened their spines recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more like true owners than was the case not long ago。 mentators on corporate governance； however； seldom make any distinction among three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist in publicly…held panies。 Though the legal responsibility of directors is identical throughout； their ability to effect change differs in each of the cases。 Attention usually falls on the first case； because it prevails on the corporate scene。 Since Berkshire falls into the second category； however； and will someday fall into the third； we will discuss all three variations。
这样的问题让我有机会谈谈近年来相当热门的话题…公司治理，首先我相信最近许多公司的董事们已开始试着把他们的腰杆打直，而现在的投资人比起以前来说，也慢慢地被公司当作真正的拥有人来对待，但是评论专家并没有仔细地去区别目前公开上市公司三种截然不同的经营权与所有权形态，虽然在法律上，董事们应该承担的责任是责无旁贷的，但他们能发挥影响力进行改变的程度却有很大的不同，大家通常都把注意力摆在第一类的案例之上，因为这是目前一般企业的常态，但由于Berkshire本身是属于第二类，甚至有一天会变成第三类，所以在这里我们有必要讨论一下三者的不同。
The first； and by far most mon； board situation is one in which a corporation has no controlling shareholder。 In that case； I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee owner； whose long…term interest they should try to further in all proper ways。 Unfortunately； 〃long…term〃 gives directors a lot of wiggle room。 If they lack either integrity or the ability to think independently； directors can do great violence to shareholders while still claiming to be acting in their long…term interest。 But assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a management that is mediocre or worse。 Directors then have the responsibility for changing that management； just as an intelligent owner would do if he were present。 And if able but greedy managers over…reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders' pockets； directors must slap their hands。
首先是第一类，也是目前最普遍的一类，在公司的股权结构中，并没有一个具掌控能力的大股东，在这种情况下，我相信董事会的行为应该要像是公司有一个因事未出席的大股东一样，在各种情况下，都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利益不会受到损害，然而很不幸的是，所谓的长期利益，反而给了董事会很大的弹性操作空间，而假设董事会运作尚称顺畅，不过经营阶层却很平庸甚至差劲时，那么董事会就必须负起责任将经营阶层换掉，就好象一般公司老板会做的决定一样，另外要是经营阶层能力尚可，只不过过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告。
In this plain…vanilla case； a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views。 If he is successful； the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change。 Suppose； though； that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him。 He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners。 Directors seldom do that； of course。 The temperament of many directors would in fact be inpatible with critical behavior of that sort。 But I see nothing improper in such actions； assuming the issues are serious。 Naturally； the plaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors； a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non…rational causes。
在这种一般常见的情况下，当个别董事发觉有不合理的现象时，应该试着说服其他董事有关他的看法，若能够成功，那么董事会就有能力做出适当的决定，但是假设要是这位落寞的董事孤掌难鸣，无法获得其它董事的支持，那么他就应该要让没能出席的股东知道他的看法，当然很少有董事真的这样做，很多的董事事实上并没有足够的胆识敢做这样大胆的动作，但我却认为这样的举动并没有什么不妥，当然假设问题真的很严重的话，自然而然发出不平之鸣的董事一定会遭到其他不认同看法的董事严正的驳斥，认为反对的董事不要在枝微末节或是非理性的原因上捣乱。
For the boards just discussed； I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number … say； ten or less … and ought to e mostly from the outside。 The outside board members should establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also periodically meet； without his being present； to evaluate his performance against those standards。
对于前述讨论的董事会形态，我认为董事的人数不必太多，最好是十个以内，同时大部分成员应该从外部遴选，而外部董事应该要能够建立对CEO表现的评核制度，并定期聚会，在CEO不在场的情况下，依据这些原则评断其表现。
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy； interest in the job； and owner…orientation。 Too often； directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board。 That practice is a mistake。 Furthermore； mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious beca