conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s。
尽管我们对于通货膨胀抱持悲观的看法，我们对于举债的兴趣还是相当有限，虽然可以肯定的是Berkshire可以靠提高举债来增加投资报酬，即使这样做我们的负债比例还是相当的保守，且就算如此我们很有信心应该可以应付比1930经济大萧条更坏的经济环境。
But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations； we wish that to be certain。 Thus we adhere to policies … both in regard to debt and all other matters … that will allow us to achieve acceptable long…term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions； rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions。
但我们还是不愿意这种大概没有问题的做法，我们要的是百分之百的确定，因此我们坚持一项政策，那就是不管是举债或是其它任何方面，我们希望是能够在最坏的情况下得到合理的结果，而不是预期在乐观的情况下，得到很好的利益。
Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results； with no aid from leverage。 Therefore； it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important （including； necessarily； the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees） for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant。 This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity： Our opinions about debt have remained constant。
只要是好公司或是好的投资决策，不靠投资杠杆，最后还是能够得到令人满意的结果，因此我们认为为了一点额外的报酬，将重要的东西（也包含政策制定者与员工福祉）暴露在不必要的风险之下是相当愚蠢且不适当的。
However； we are not phobic about borrowing。 （We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt。） We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe … on a worst…case basis … will pose no threat to Berkshire's well…being。 Analyzing what that amount might be； we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy： Berkshire's earnings e from many diverse and well…entrenched businesses； these businesses seldom require much capital investment； what debt we have is structured well； and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets。 Clearly； we could be fortable with a higher debt…to…business…value ratio than we now have。
当然我们不会畏惧借贷（我们还不至于认为借钱是万恶不赦的），我们还是愿意在估计不会损及Berkshire利益的最坏情况下，进行举债，至于这个限度在哪里，我们就必须评估自己本身的实力， Berkshire的获利来自于许多不同且扎实的产业，这些产业通常不需要额外大量的投资，负债的部份也相当健全，同时我们还保有大量的流动资产，很明显的，我们大可以承担比现在更高的负债比例。
One further aspect of our debt policy deserves ment： Unlike many in the business world； we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it。 A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well。 This means obtaining the highest…possible return on assets and the lowest…possible cost on liabilities。 It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided。 However； reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case： Tight money conditions； which translate into high costs for liabilities； will create the best opportunities for acquisitions； and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky。 Our conclusion： Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side。
我们举债政策还有一向特点值得说明，不像其它公司，我们比较希望能够预先准备而不是事后补救，一家公司若能够同时管好资产负债表的两侧，就会有不错的成绩，这代表一方面要能够将资产的报酬率提高，一方面要能够将负债的资金成本降低，若是两边都能碰巧的兼顾那就太好了，不过事实告诉我们，通常情况正好相反，当资金吃紧时，代表负债的成本上升，这正是对外购并的最好时机，因为便宜的资金有时会将竞标的资产飙到天价，我们的结论是，在举债方面的动作，有时应该要跟购置资产方面的动作分开做。
Alas； what is 〃tight〃 and 〃cheap〃 money is far from clear at any particular time。 We have no ability to forecast interest rates and … maintaining our usual open…minded spirit … believe that no one else can。 Therefore； we simply borrow when conditions seem non…oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities； which … as we have said … are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive。 Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare； fast…moving elephants； you should always carry a loaded gun。
当然何谓吃紧﹖何谓便宜的资金﹖很难有一个清楚的分野，我们无法去预测利率的走向，所以我们随时保持开放的心态，随机地在市场还没有那么悲观时借钱，期望之后可以找到合适的购并或投资标的，而通常如同我们先前所提到的，大概是会在债市情况悲观时出现，我们一个基本的原则就是，如果你想要猎捕那种罕见且移动迅速的大象，那么你的枪枝就要随时上膛准备。
Our fund…first； buy…or…expand…later policy almost always penalizes near…term earnings。 For example； we are now earning about 6 1/2％ on the 250 million we recently raised at 10％； a disparity that is currently costing us about 160；000 per week。 This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher…yielding short…term instruments。 If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so； the wait will have been worthwhile。
我们这种先准备资金，之后再买进扩张的政策，虽然会对我们短期间的盈余造成影响，例如我们之前取得10％成本的2。5亿美元，现在大概只能赚得6。5％的收益，中间的利差损失每个礼拜大概是16万美元，这对我们来说，只是个小数目，也不会迫使我们去从事一些短期高风险的投资，只要我们能在未来五年内找到理想的目标猎物，这一切等待都是值得的。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have； and we can use some help。 If you have a business that fits the following criteria； call me or； preferably； write。
我们希望能够找到更多像我们现在拥有的企业，当然这需要一些帮助，如同你知道有公司符合以下的条件，打电话或者最好是写信给我。
（1）巨额交易（每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元）
（2）持续稳定获利（我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣）
（3）高股东报酬率（并且甚少举债）
（4）具备管理阶层（我们无法提供）
（5）简单的企业（若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂）
（6）合理的价格（在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间）我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣 （通常不超过五分钟） ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案 （那些说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的） 。在此重申我们对这些一点兴趣都没有。
Here's what we're looking for：
（1） large purchases （at least 10 million of after…tax earnings）； （2） demonstrated consistent earning power （future projections are of little interest to us； nor are 〃turnaround〃 situations）； （3） businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt； （4） management in place （we can't supply it）； （5） simple businesses （if there's lots of technology； we won't understand it）； （6） an offering price （we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking； even preliminarily； about a transaction when price is unknown）。 We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers。 We can promise plete confidentiality and a very fast answer … customarily within five minutes … as to whether we're interested。 We prefer to buy for cash； but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give。 We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past。 For the right business … and the right people … we can provide a good home。 On the other hand； we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't e close to meeting our tests： new ventures； turnarounds； auction…like sales； and the ever…popular （among brokers） 〃I'm…sure…something…will…work…out…if…you…people…get…to…know…each…other。〃 None of these attracts us in the least。 Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above； we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large； but not controlling； blocks of stock parable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon。 We have a special inter