算，目前Berkshire真实的价值已大幅超越其帐面价值，过去24年以来，企业价值成长的速度一直要比帐面价值成长的幅度要高一点，但在1988年情况有点不同，后者增加的幅度略高于前者。
Berkshire past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist。 Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42…year…old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average。
过去Berkshire真实与帐面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚其间的差异，就好象是一位棒球教练在判断高龄42岁的中外野手未来潜力时，以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。
Important negatives affecting our prospects today are： （1） a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years； （2） higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment ine； （3） a far more richly…priced market for the acquisition of businesses； and （4） industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。； GEICO Corporation； and The Washington Post pany … Berkshire three permanent investments； constituting about one…half of our net worth … that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago。 All of these panies have superb management and strong properties。 But； at current prices； their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago。
今日我们所面临不利的因素主要有︰（1）目前的股票市场过热，股价相对偏高（2）企业投资利益的税负过高（3）企业被购并的价格偏高（4） Berkshire主要三大投资事业（约占本公司净值的一半） 资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报，个别的产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。
The major problem we face； however； is a growing capital base。 You have heard that from us before； but this problem； like age； grows in significance each year。 （And also； just as with age； it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it old。？
然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，（当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好）
Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of 3。9 billion to achieve a 15％ annual return over the decade then ahead。 Today； for the next decade； a 15％ return demands profits of 10。3 billion。 That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger； Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner。 （Should that number indeed prove too big； Charlie will find himself； in future reports； retrospectively identified as the senior partner。）
四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，Berkshire想要每年维持15％的报酬，我们总共约要有39亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元，对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，（当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人）
As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns； we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago。 Then； all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics。 Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses。
虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒�；水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67％。
Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven： Buffalo News； Fechheimer； Kirby； Nebraska Furniture Mart； Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group； See； and World Book。 In 1988 the Saints came marching in。 You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical…cost financial statements on page 45； which bine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units。 With no benefit from financial leverage； this group earned about 67％ on average equity capital。 In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise； in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor。 The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone。
虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。
In my judgment； these businesses； in aggregate； will continue to produce superb returns。 We’ll need these： Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15％ goal。 You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver； the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate。
根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们想要在往后年度继续维持15％报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。
In that respect； we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80％ interest in Borsheim； a jewelry business in Omaha。 This purchase； described later in this letter； delivers exactly what we look for： an outstanding business run by people we like； admire； and trust。 It’s a great way to start the year。
在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈Borsheim珠宝80％的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。
Accounting Changes
会计原则变动
We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988； and likely will have another to make in 1990。 When we move figures around from year to year； without any change in economic reality； one of our always…thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary。
1988年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望1990年还会有一项变动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计帐面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面。首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必就此废除，CEO大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。
First； Il offer my customary disclaimer： Despite the shortings of generally accepted accounting principles （GAAP）； I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules。 The limitations of the existing set； however； need not be inhibiting： CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors … and indeed they should。 After all； any manager of a subsidiary pany would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss； the parent corporation CEO。 Why； then； should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses … the shareholder…owners of the corporation？ What needs to be reported is data … whether GAAP； non…GAAP； or extra…GAAP … that helps financially…literate readers answer three key questions： （1） Approximately how much is this pany worth？ （2） What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations？ and （3） How good a job are its managers doing； given the hand they have been dealt？
真正需要的是资料�；不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题︰（1）这家公司大概价值多少？（2）它达到未来目标的可能性有多大？（3）在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何？
In most cases； answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation。 The business world is simply too plex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises； particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses； such as Berkshire。
大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用一套简单的规则有效地来解释企�