大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像Berkshire这种由许多各种不同产业组成集团。
Further plicating the problem is the fact that manymanagements view GAAP not as a standard to be met； but as an obstacle to overe。 Too often their accountants willingly assist them。 （ow much says the client； s two plus two？？ Replies the cooperative accountant； hat number did you have in mind？？ Even honest and well…intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance。 Both the smoothing of earnings and the ig bath quarter are hit lie？ techniques employed by otherwise upright managements。
更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几？配合的会计师可能会回答︰「那要看你想要多少？」即使是诚实且正直的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶层经常运用的做帐技巧。
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud。 They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel。 So these charlatans interpret the rules imaginatively and record business transactions in ways that technically ply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world。
另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。
As long as investors … including supposedly sophisticated institutions … place fancy valuations on reported arnings that march steadily upward； you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers； no matter what the truth may be。 Over the years； Charlie and I have observed many accounting…based frauds of staggering size。 Few of the perpetrators have been punished； many have not even been censured。 It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun。
只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988； we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement。 In the past； Mutual Savings and Loan； and Scott Fetzer Financial （a credit pany that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products） were consolidated on a one…line basis。 That meant we （1） showed our equity in their bined net worths as a single…entry asset on Berkshire consolidated balance sheet and （2） included our equity in their bined annual earnings as a single…line ine entry in our consolidated statement of earnings。 Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these panies in our balance sheet and each item of their ine and expense in our earnings statement。
1988年一般公认会计原则有一个很重大的转变，依新规定Berkshire必须将子公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷与史考特费兹金融（主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公司），只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说（1）仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在Berkshire的合并资产负债表之上（2）仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例以投资利益显示在Berkshire的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。
This change underscores the need for panies also to report segmented data： The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements； the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier。 Indeed； the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements。 On the other hand； Charlie and I constantly study our segment data。
这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题，事实上在Berkshire我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部规定，查理跟我看的则是另一套部门别的信息。
Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements； we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance。 （Berkshire ability to discharge its obligations to creditors … the third question we listed … should be obvious； whatever statements you examine。） In these supplementary presentations； we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures； or even corporate structure。 Rather； we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail。 Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed。
现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理当局的表现，Berkshire将责任转移给债权人的能力�；我们提到的第三个问题，应该很明确，不管是在看什么样的报表，在这些补充信息中，我们不一定会依照一般公认会计原则，甚至不会以公司别来区分，相反地我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总有助于大家分析而不是被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重要的讯息。
On pages 41…47 we show separate bined balance sheets and earnings statements for： （1） our subsidiaries engaged in finance…type operations； which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial； （2） our insurance operations； with their major investment positions itemized； （3） our manufacturing； publishing and retailing businesses； leaving aside certain non…operating assets and purchase…price accounting adjustments； and （4） an all…other category that includes the non…operating assets （primarily marketable securities） held by the panies in （3） as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent panies。
下表我们依（1）金融事业，包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司（2）保险事业，依投资部位分门别类（3）制造、出版、零售事业，去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调整数（4）其它项目，包含前述非营业资产（主要是有价证券投资）及Wesco与Berkshire母公司所持有的资产与负债
If you bine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments； you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements。 However； we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors； who in no way bless it。 （In fact； they may be horrified； I don’t want to ask。）
如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总，你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数，但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过，最好是不要，因为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。
I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990。 This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes； and is both plicated and controversial … so much so that its imposition； originally scheduled for 1989； was postponed for a year。
先前我曾提到在1990年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动，主要与递延所得税有关，这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计画于1989年实施延后一年。
When implemented； the new rule will affect us in various ways。 Most important； we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance panies。
当这项原则开始实施后，对我们有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，其计算递延所得税负债的方式，
Right now； our liability is layered。 For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years； 1。2 billion； we have booked a 28％ tax liability。 For the unrealized appreciation built up since； 600 million； the tax liability has been booked at 34％。 The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987。
原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层，对于1986年以前帐列未实现利益，大约在12亿美元左右，系以28％的税率估算，对于1986年之后的帐列未实现利益，大约在6亿美元左右，系以34％的税率估算
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