大部分的时间我们买进RJR相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗兄公司有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔绝，而我们认为这样也好，额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还会妨碍到Berkshire进行套利的投资。
However； the unusually large mitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved。 Therefore； Berkshire purchases of RJR were made at only two times： first； in the few days immediately following management announcement of buyout plans； before Salomon became involved； and considerably later； after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR。 Because we could not buy at other times； our directorships cost Berkshire significant money。
然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参与，因此Berkshire总共只有两个时点可以进行买进RJR的动作，第一次是当RJR经营阶层宣布整个购并计画的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标，另外是后来RJR董事会决定优先考虑KKR的提案，也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得Berkshire的投资成本大大提高。
Considering Berkshire good results in 1988； you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989。 Instead； we expect to be on the sidelines。
看到1988年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。
One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down … because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up。 As regular readers of this report know； our new mitments are not based on a judgment about short…term prospects for the stock market。 Rather； they reflect an opinion about long…term business prospects for specific panies。 We do not have； never have had； and never will have an opinion about where the stock market； interest rates； or business activity will be a year from now。
一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不是基于短期股市的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不会对短期股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。
Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989。 Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field。 As Dorothy says： oto； I have a feeling wee not in Kansas any more。？
然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，购并市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像桃乐斯所说的：「奥图，我觉得我们好象已经不是在堪萨斯市了！」
We have no idea how long the excesses will last； nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government； lender and buyer that fuel them。 But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs； the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs。 We have no desireto arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled … and； in our view； often unwarranted … optimism of both buyers and lenders。 In our activities； we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein： if something can go on forever； it will end。？
我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人越没有信心参与这些活动时，我们的信心也就越高，我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观，通常我们认为那是无保障的，在此我们宁愿注重Herb Stein的智能，若一件事不能持久不衰，那么它终将结束。
Efficient Market Theory
效率市场理论
The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of fficient market theory？（EMT） also seem relevant。 This doctrine became highly fashionable … indeed； almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s。 Essentially； it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices。 In other words； the market always knew everything。 As a corollary； the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest； most hard…working security analyst。 Amazingly； EMT was embraced not only by academics； but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well。 Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient； they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient。 The difference between these propositions is night and day。
前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下市场效率理论，这理论在近年来变得非常热门，尤其在1970年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上，换句话说，市场永远知道所有的事，学校教市场效率理论的教授因此做了一个推论，比喻说任何一个人射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美，华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师所选出来的投资组合，令人惊讶的是市场效率理论不但为学术界所拥抱，更被许多投资专家与企业经理人所接受，正确地观察到市场往往是具有效率的，他们却继续下了错误的结论，市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之别。
In my opinion； the continuous 63…year arbitrage experience of Graham…Newman Corp。 Buffett Partnership； and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is。 （There plenty of other evidence； also。） While at Graham…Newman； I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926…1956 lifespan of the pany。 Unleveraged returns averaged 20％ per year。 Starting in 1956； I applied Ben Graham arbitrage principles； first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire。 Though Ie not made an exact calculation； I have done enough work to know that the 1956…1988 returns averaged well over 20％。 （Of course； I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben； he had 1929…1932 to contend with。）
就我个人的看法，就我个人过去在葛拉罕…纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙企业与Berkshire公司连续63年的套利经验，说明了效率市场理论有多么的愚蠢（当然还有其它一堆证据），当初在葛拉罕…纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司1926年到1956年的套利成果做了一番研究，每年平均20％的投资报酬率，之后从1956年开始我在巴菲特合伙企业与之后的Berkshire公司，运用葛拉罕的套利原则，虽然我并没有仔细地去算，但1956年到1988年间的投资报酬率应该也有超过20％，（当然之后的投资环境比起葛拉罕当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过1929…1932年的景气大萧条）。
All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance： （1） the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63…year record； （2） the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences； （3） we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements … we simply acted on highly…publicized events； and （4） our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe … they have not been selected by hindsight。
所有的条件皆以具备来公平测试投资组合的表现（1）三个公司63年来买卖了上百种不同的股票证券（2）结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲（3）我们不需要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是从事高度公开的个案（4）我们的套利部份可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特别挑选出来的
Over the 63 years； the general market delivered just under a 10％ annual return； including dividends。 That means 1；000 would have grown to 405；000 if all ine had been reinvested。 A 20％ rate of return； however； would have produced 97 million。 That strikes us as a statistically…significant differential that might； conceivably； arouse one curiosity。
过去63年来，大盘整体的投资报酬（加计股利）大概只有10％，意思是说若当初投入1；000美元的话，现在可以获得405；000美元，但是若投资报酬率改为20％的话，现在却会变成9；700万美元，统计上如此大的差异使得我们不禁好奇的想要怀疑，然而理论支持者从来就不会去注意理论与现实如此地不相符，确实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，市场效率理论还是继续在各个企管名校间列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有神学家才做的出来。
Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type。 True； they don talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to。 But no one； to my knowledge； has ever said he was wrong； no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed。 EMT； moreover； continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools。 Apparently； a reluctance to recant； and thereby to demystify the priesthood； is not limited to theologians。 Naturally the disservice done