？ 还好三年之后，算我走狗运，能够以成本价左右的价格脱身，在跟Hochschild Kohn公司结束关系之后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，「我的老婆跟我最要好的朋友跑了，我是多么地怀念他！」
I could give you other personal examples of 〃bargain…purchase〃 folly but I'm sure you get the picture： It's far better to buy a wonderful pany at a fair price than a fair pany at a wonderful price。 Charlie understood this early； I was a slow learner。 But now； when buying panies or mon stocks； we look for first…class businesses acpanied by first…class managements。
我可以给各位另外一个个人经验，以合理的价格买下一家好公司要比用便宜的价格买下一家普通的公司来的好的多，像查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些公司还要有好的经理人。
That leads right into a related lesson： Good jockeys will do well on good horses； but not on broken…down nags。 Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild； Kohn had able and honest people running them。 The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records。 But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand。
从这里我们又学到了一课，好的马还要搭配好骑师才能有好成绩，像Berkshire纺织与Hochschild； Kohn也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的是流沙般的困境，若能将这些人摆在体质更好的公司相信他们应该会有更好的成绩。
I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics； it is the reputation of the business that remains intact。 I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples。 My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West： 〃I was Snow White； but I drifted。〃
我曾说过好几次，当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是Mae West曾说的︰「曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。」
A further related lesson： Easy does it。 After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses； Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems。 What we have learned is to avoid them。 To the extent we have been successful； it is because we concentrated on identifying one…foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven…footers。
另外还学到一个教训，在经历25年企业管理与经营各种不同事业的岁月之后，查理跟我还是没能学会如此去解决难题，不过我们倒学会如何去避免他们，在这点我们倒做的相当成功，我们专挑那种一呎的低栏，而避免碰到七呎的跳高。
The finding may seem unfair； but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult。 On occasion； tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo。 In other instances； a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one…time huge； but solvable； problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO。 Overall； however； we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them。
这项发现看起来似乎是不太公平，不管是在经营企业或是投资通长坚持在容易又明显的好公司会比死守在有问题的公司要来的好，当然有时困难的问题也有被解决的机会，像是我们刚开始在经营水牛城报纸一样，或是有时一家好公司也会有暂时的难关，像是以前美国运通与GEICO都曾经一度发生状况，不过总的来说，我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。
My most surprising discovery： the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call 〃the institutional imperative。〃 In business school； I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world。 I thought then that decent； intelligent； and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions。 But I learned over time that isn't so。 Instead； rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative es into play。
我最意外的发现是企业一种看不到的巨大影响力，我们称之为〃系统规范〃，在学校时没有人告诉我这种规范的存在，而我也不是一开始进入商业世界就知道有这回事，我以为任何正当、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做这样的决策，但慢慢地我发现完全就不是这么一回事，相反的理性的态度在系统规范的影响下都会慢慢地变质。
For example： （1） As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion； an institution will resist any change in its current direction； （2） Just as work expands to fill available time； corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds； （3） Any business craving of the leader； however foolish； will be quickly supported by detailed rate…of…return and strategic studies prepared by his troops； and （4） The behavior of peer panies； whether they are expanding； acquiring； setting executive pensation or whatever； will be mindlessly imitated。
举例来说（1）就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律所规范，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗对现有方向做任何的改变（2）就像拥有会有工作来填满所有的时间，企业的计画或购并案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽（3）任何一个崇拜领导者的组织，不管有多离谱，他的追随者永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告（4）同业的举动，不管是做扩张、购并或是订定经理人待遇等都会在无意间彼此模仿。
Institutional dynamics； not venality or stupidity； set businesses on these courses； which are too often misguided。 After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative； I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence。 Furthermore； Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in panies that appear alert to the problem。
是组织的动力而非腐败或愚蠢，误导他们走上这些路子，也因为我忽略了这种规律的力量，使我为这些所犯的错误付出高昂的代价，之后我便试图组织管理Berkshire尽量让这种规律降低其影响程度，同时查理跟我也试着将我们的投资集中在对于这种问题有相当警觉的公司之上。
After some other mistakes； I learned to go into business only with people whom I like； trust； and admire。 As I noted before； this policy of itself will not ensure success： A second…class textile or department…store pany won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry。 However； an owner … or investor … can acplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics。 Conversely； we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities； no matter how attractive the prospects of their business。 We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person。
再犯下其它几个错误之后，我试着尽量只与我们所欣赏喜爱与信任的人往来，就像是我之前曾提到的，这种原则本身不会保证你一定成功，二流的纺织工厂或是百货公司不会只因为管理人员是那种你会想把女儿嫁给他的人就会成功的，然而公司的老板或是投资人却可以因为与那些真正具有商业头脑的人打交道而获益良多，相反地我们不会希望跟那些不具令人尊敬的特质为伍，不管他的公司有多吸引人都一样，我们永远不会靠着与坏人打交道而成功。
Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible。 These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make。 It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of petence。 But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding。 For Berkshire's shareholders； myself included； the cost of this thumb…sucking has been huge。
其实有些更严重的错误大家根本就看不到，那是一些明明我很熟悉了解的股票或公司，但却因故没有能完成投资，错失一些能力之外的大好机会当然没有罪，但是我却白白错过一些自动送上门，应该把握却没有好好把握的好买卖，对于Berkshire的股东，当然包括我自己本身在内，这种损失是难以估计的。
Our consistently…conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake； but in my view were not。 In retrospect； it is clear that significantly higher； though still conventional； leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23。8％ we have actually averaged。 Even in 1965； perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99％ probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good。 Correspondingly； we might have seen only a 1％ chance that some shock factor； external or internal； would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish an