e continue to aim for a 15％ average annual gain in intrinsic value。 But； as we never tire of telling you； this goal bees ever more difficult to reach as our equity base； now 5。3 billion； increases。
Berkshire过去26年来辉煌的记录并不足以确保未来也会如此发展，当然我们也希望过去一年惨痛的记录也不能代表未来的结果就是如此，我们还是依旧将目标订在每年15％的实质价值成长率，只是还有一点是过去从未向各位报告的，以我们现在的股权规模，要完成这项任务的门槛是53亿美金！
If we do attain that 15％ average； our shareholders should fare well。 However； Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them。 For example； if you buy at a 10％ premium to intrinsic value； if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15％ a year； and if you then sell at a 10％ premium； your own return will correspondingly be 15％ pounded。 （The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid。） If； however； you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium； your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the pany。
要是我们真的能够达到这样的目标，那么我们的股东一定赚翻了，因为Berkshire的企业获利将会为那些买卖价格与公司实质价值一致的投资人创造相同的获利，举例来说，如果你以实质价值10％的溢价买进Berkshire股份，假设后来公司实质价值每年成长了15％，而之后你同样以实质价值10％的溢价卖出所持有的股份，则你的投资年报酬率应该也会是15％（这个例子假设期间公司并未发放任何股利），当然要是后来你以低于10％的溢价卖出股份的话，那么你最后所得到的投资报酬率可能就会低于公司同期间15％的报酬率。
Ideally； the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the pany during his period of ownership。 That is why Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner； and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value。 We prefer such steadiness to the value…ignoring volatility of the past two years： In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value； which was up 44％； while the market price rose 85％； in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount； while the market price fell 23％。
在理想的情况下，Berkshire所有的股东的投资报酬，在其拥有公司部份所有权的期间，应该会与公司本身的经营成果相符，这也是为什么查理孟格…Berkshire的副主席，也是主要的合伙人，和我本身都希望Berkshire的股价能与其所代表的实质价值维持一定关系的原因，相较于过去两年股市默视价值的任意波动，我们宁愿Berkshire股价稳定一点，1989年的实质价值约成长幅度远低于帐面价值44％的增加幅度，与股价85％的大涨；到了1990年，帐面价值与实质价值都略微增加，但同期间的本公司的股票价格却下跌了23％。。
Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin。 We can't tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate； Charlie and I might； in fact； differ by 10％ in our appraisals。 We do know； however； that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books。
截至目前为止，Berkshire的实质价值仍与帐面价值仍有一段不小的差距，不过我们无法告诉你实际的数字是多少，因为实质价值本身就是一个估计数，事实上光是查理与我自己本身所估出来的数字就可能有超过10％的差距，不过可以确信的是，我们所拥有一些优秀的企业其实际的价值远高于列示在公司帐上的投资成本。
Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them。 Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they possess： These superstars just came that way。 Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff。 Having done it； they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other task： the intelligent deployment of these funds。
我们的被投资公司之所以能够拥有这么多额外的价值，完全要归功于经营它们的这批优秀经理人，查理跟我可以很自在地夸耀这支团队，因为他们之所以能够拥有这些才能与我们一点关系都没有，这些超级经理人一直都是如此，而我们的工作只不过是发掘这些有才能的经理人同时提供一个环境，让他们可以好好地发挥，就这样他们就会将现金源源不绝地送回总部，接下来我们就会面临另一项重要的任务…如何有效地运用这些资金。
My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter； Emily； and her fourth birthday party last fall。 Attending were other children； adoring relatives； and Beemer the Clown； a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act。
我个人在营运上扮演的角色可由我孙女Emily的一个小故事来做说明，去年秋天在她四岁的生日宴会上，参加的人除了小朋友与疼爱她的家人之外，还有一位小丑演员Beemer，席间他还特地为大家表演了一段魔术。
Beginning these； Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a 〃magic wand〃 over 〃the box of wonders。〃 Green handkerchiefs went into the box； Emily waved the wand； and Beemer removed blue ones。 Loose handkerchiefs went in and； upon a magisterial wave by Emily； emerged knotted。 After four such transformations； each more amazing than its predecessor； Emily was unable to contain herself。 Her face aglow； she exulted： 〃Gee； I'm really good at this。〃
一开始Beemer请Emily帮他拿一支神奇的魔棒在一个宝贝箱上挥舞，绿色的手帕放进箱子里，在Emily挥了棒子一下之后，跑出来蓝色的手帕；接着又放进一条手帕，Emily又挥了一下，这回跑出一条打结的手帕，经过四回合一次比一次精彩的表演之后，Emily喜不自胜，脸上发光沾沾自喜的大叫，「我实在是太厉害了！」
And that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire's business magicians … the Blumkins； the Friedman family； Mike Goldberg； the Heldmans； Chuck Huggins； Stan Lipsey and Ralph Schey。 They deserve your applause。
这就是我在Berkshire的所有贡献，感谢旗下企业所有的魔术师… Blumkins家族、Friedman 家族、Mike Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey与Ralph Schey等人，请为这些人精彩的演出给予热烈的掌声。
Sources of Reported Earnings帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings。 In this presentation； amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase…price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply； but are instead aggregated and shown separately。 This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them。 I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles （GAAP）； which require purchase…price adjustments to be made on a business…by…business basis。 The total net earnings we show in the table are； of course； identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements。
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
Much additional information about these businesses is given on pages 39…46； where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis。 For information on Wesco's businesses； I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter； which starts on page 56。 His letter also contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking industry that I have seen。
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对银行产业写的最详尽精辟的分析。
（000s omitted） Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings （after taxes and Pre…Tax Earnings minority interests）
Operating Earnings： Insurance Group
Underwriting Net Investment Ine Buffalo News Fechheimer Kirby Nebraska Furniture Mart
1990 （26；647） 327；048 43；954 12；450 27；445 17；248
1989 （24；400） 243；599 46；047 12；621 26；114 17；070
1990 （14；936） 282；613 25；981 6；605 17；613 8；485
1989 （12；259） 213；642 27；771 6；789 16；803 8；441
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group See's Candies Wesco … other than Insurance World Book Amortization of Goodwill
1990 30；378 39；580 12；441 31；896 （3；476）
1989 33；165 34；235 13；008 25；583 （3；387）
1990 18；458 23；892 9；676 20；420 （3；461）
1989 19；996 20；626 9；810 16；372 （3；372）
Other Purchase…Price
Accounting Charges Inter