9。6 6。5 3。8 3。8 3。0 2。6 3。1 3。3 4。1 5。0
Source： A。M。 Best Co。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 The higher the ratio； the worse the year。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107 … 111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of 10％ annually； even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower。 （Over the last 25 years； incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate； 11％。） If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount； though the industry's tendency to under…reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，（事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11％的速度在成长），虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。
Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10％ and underwriting results therefore worsened。 （In our table； however； the severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry's 1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trendline。） The bined ratio will again increase in 1991； probably by about two points。
去年保费收入的成长远低于最基本的10％要求，承保成绩可想而知会继续恶化， （不过在这张表上，1990年恶化的程度因为1989年发生Hugo飓风钜额损失而被略微掩盖），1991年的综合比率将会再度恶化，有可能会增加2个百分点以上。
Results will improve only when most insurance managements bee so fearful that they run from business； even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist。 At some point these managements will indeed get the message： The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging。 But so farthat point hasn't gotten across： Insurance managers continue to dig … sullenly but vigorously。
虽然以现在的市场状况保险业者大可以用比现在更高的价格来作生意，但营运结果却只可能在所有的保险公司主管因为恐惧而远离市场时才有可能好转，就某种程度而言，这些经理人应该已经收到了一些讯息，当你发现自己深陷洞中最重要的一件事就是不要再挖了，不过这个临界点显然还没到，许多保险公司虽然不甘愿但还是用力地在挖洞。
The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur。 Absent such a shock； one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses bee large enough to raise management fear to a level that would spur major price increases。 When that moment arrives； Berkshire will be ready … both financially and psychologically … to write huge amounts of business。
还好这种情况可能在发生重大的天然灾害或金融风暴后很快地改变，但若是没有这类事件发生，可能还要再等一、两年，直到所有的保险公司受不了钜额的承保损失，才有可能迫使经理人大幅提高保费，而等那个时刻到来时，Berkshire一定会作好准备，不论是在财务上或是心理上，等着接下大笔大笔的保单。
In the meantime； our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory。 In the next section of this report we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results。 From that discussion； you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager； Mike Goldberg； and his cadre of stars； Rod Eldred； Dinos Iordanou； Ajit Jain； and Don Wurster。
在此同时，我们的保费收入虽然很少但还是处于可以接受的范围，在下一段报告中我会告诉大家如何去衡量保险公司的绩效表现，看完之后你就会明了，为何我对我们的保险事业经理人，包含Mike Goldberg与他的明星团队Rod Eldred、Dinos Lordanou、Ajit Jalin与Don Wurster的表现会感到如此满意了。
In assessing our insurance results over the next few years； you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile。 If this line of business expands； as it may； our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you might expect： In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations and in an occasional year we will fall far below them。
在衡量我们保险事业过去几年的经营绩效时，大家必须特别注意因为我们所追求的生意形态而造成经营结果的波动，若是这类型的生意扩张，事实上这很有可能，则我们的承保结果可能会与一般产业趋势有很大的差异，大部分的时候，我们的成绩会超乎大家的预期，但很有可能在某一年度又大幅落后在产业标准之下。
The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have bee a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes （〃super…cats〃）； which could for example be hurricanes； windstorms or earthquakes。 The buyers of these policies are reinsurance panies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers and that wish to 〃lay off；〃 or rid themselves； of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity。 Because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress … perhaps even chaos … in the insurance business； they seek financially strong sellers。 And here we have a major petitive advantage： In the industry； our strength is unmatched。
我预估的波动主要是反应在我们即将成为真正超大型意外灾害保单（又称霹雳猫）承保人的事实之上，这些灾害有可能是飓风、风暴或是地震，这类保单的购买者大多是接受一般保险业者分散风险的再保公司，由于他们自己本身也要分散或是卸下部份单一重要灾害的风险，而由于这些保险公司主要是希望在发生若干重大的意外后，在一片混乱之中还能有可以依靠的对象，所以在选择投保对象时，首重的就是财务实力，而这正是我们最主要的竞争优势，在这个业界，我们坚强的实力是别人所比不上的。
A typical super…cat contract is plicated。 But in a plain… vanilla instance we might write a one…year； 10 million policy providing that the buyer； a reinsurer； would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results： （1） specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount； and （2） aggregate losses for the insurance industry of； say； more than 5 billion。 Under virtually all circumstances； loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met。
典型的霹雳猫合约相当的复杂，不过以一个最简单的例子来说，我们可能签下一年期，1；000万美元的保单，其中规定再保公司在灾害造成两种状况下才有可能得到理赔，（1）再保公司的损失超过一定的门槛（2）整个保险业界的总损失超过一定的门槛，假设是50亿美元，只是通常在第二种条件符合时，第一个条件也会达到标准。
For this 10 million policy； we might receive a premium of； say； 3 million。 Say； also； that we take in annual premiums of 100 million from super…cat policies of all kinds。 In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to 100 million or a loss of well over 200 million。 Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do； we are concentrating it。 Therefore； our yearly bined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100 … 120； but will instead be close to either zero or 300％。
对于这种1；000万的保单，我们收取的保费可能会在300万左右，假设我们一年收到所有的霹雳猫保费收入为1亿美元，则有可能某些年度我们可以认列将近1亿美元的利益，但也有可能在单一年度要认列2亿美元的损失，值得注意的是我们不像其它保险公司是在分散风险，相反地我们是将风险集中，因此在这一部份，我们的综合比率不像一般业者会介于100…120之间，而是有可能会介于0…300之间。
Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings。 And if they have the ability to do so； they often lack the desire。 They may back away； for example； because they write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on super… cat reinsurance。 In addition； most corporate managements believe that their share