s data we have puted a 〃cost of funds developed from insurance。〃
下一页是我们进入保险业后，每年的承保损失统计（若有的话），以及每年平均持有的浮存金数量，从这个表我们可以很轻易地算出保险事业所产生的浮存金其资金成本是多少。
（1） （2） Yearend Yield Underwriting Approximate on Long…Term Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％
1968 。 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1976 。 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation； but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored。
浮存金的数字是将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，若是别的保险业者可能还有其它项目需要列入做计算，但因为这些科目在Berkshire并不重要，所以予以省略。
During 1990 we held about 1。6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others。 The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was 27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1。6％。 As the table shows； we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero。 In other years； such as 1984； we paid a very high price for float。 In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance； though； we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government。
在1990年我们大概持有16亿美元的浮存金，这些钱会慢慢地流到其它人的手中，当年度的承保损失约为2；600万美元，因此我们从保险营运所获得的资金，其成本约为1。6％，而就如同这张表所显示的，有些年度我们有承保获利，所以我们的资金成本甚至低于零，但是也有些年度，像1984年我们必须为浮存金支付相当高的成本，但是总计至今24个年度当中有19个年度，我们负担的资金成本甚至比美国政府发行债券的成本还低。
There are two important qualifications to this calculation。 First； the fat lady has yet to gargle； let alone sing； and we won't know our true 1967 … 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now。 Second； the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment ine these funds earn。 Direct investments would be more tax…efficient。
这项计算式有两个重要的要求，首先胖女人漱口都很难听了，更何况还要她唱歌，除非等到这时间所发生的损失都已确定解决，否则我们不能确定1967年…1990年的资金成本到底是多少，第二浮存金对于股东的价值有点打折，因为股东们还必须投入相对的资金来支持保险事业的营运，同时这些资金所赚取的投资收益又必须面临双重的课税，相较之下直接投资的税负就少多了。
The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial。 Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise； I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance pany would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float。 I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire。
间接投资加诸在股东身上的租税惩罚事实上是相当重的，虽然计算公式铁定没办法做的很精确，但我估计对于这些保险事业的所有者来说，租税惩罚至少让他们增加一个百分点以上的资金成本，我想这个数字也适用于Berkshire之上。
Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders。 If this cost （including the tax penalty） is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds； the value is negative。 If the cost is lower； the value is positive … and if the cost is significantly lower； the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset。
分析保险事业的资金成本使得任何人都可以据此判断这家公司的营运对于股东到底是正面的还是负面的，若是这项成本（包含租税惩罚）高于其它替代性的资金来源，其价值就是负的，若是成本更低，那么对股东便能产生正面的价值，而若是成本远低于一般水准，那么这个事业就是一项相当有价值的资产。
So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly…lower camp。 Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO； in which our ownership interest is now 48％ and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit。 GEICO's growth has generated an ever…larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero。 Essentially； GEICO's policyholders； in aggregate； pay the pany interest on the float rather than the other way around。 （But handsome is as handsome does： GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks； a package that in turn allows rock…bottom prices for policyholders。）
到目前为止，Berkshire算是资金成本相当低的那类，虽然我们拥有48％股权的GEICO的比率更好，且通常每年都享有承保获利，GEICO藉由不断地成长提供越来越多的资金以供投资，而且它的资金成本还远低于零成本以下，意思是说GEICO的保单持有人不但要先付保费给公司而且还要支付利息，（但就像有人又帅又有才干，GEICO非凡的获利能力导因于公司经营的效率与对风险的严格分类，如此使得保户也可享受超低价格的保单）。
Many well…known insurance panies； on the other hand； incur an underwriting loss/float cost that； bined with the tax penalty； produces negative results for owners。 In addition； these panies； like all others in the industry； are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart。 Unless these panies can materially improve their underwriting performance … and history indicates that is an almost impossible task … their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans。
在另外一方面，许多知名的保险公司，在考量承保损失/浮存金成本，再加上租税惩罚之后，事实上让股东产生负的报酬，此外这些公司像其它业者一样，相当容易受到大型灾害的伤害，在扣除再保部份所得到的保护之后，资金成本率还是有可能升高到无以复加的地步，而除非这些公司能够大幅改善其承保的成绩，历史的经验显示这是项不可能的任务，这些股东很可能会和吸收较高的存款利息支出，却只能收到较低的借款利息收入的银行股东一样的下场。
All in all； the insurance business has treated us very well。 We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable； and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low…cost funds。 Our shareholders； true； have incurred extra taxes； but they have been more than pensated for this cost （so far） by the benefits produced by the float。
总的来说，保险营运给我们的回报算是相当不错的了，我们的保险浮存金以合理的资金成本率持续增加，而靠着这些低成本的资金赚取更高的投资报酬使我们的事业蒸蒸日上，确实我们的股东必须负担额外的税负，但大家从这样低的资金成本所获得的利益却补回更多（至少到目前为止是如此）。
A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival。 Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error； and when opportunity knocked； too often I answered。 Many years later； the bills keep arriving for these mistakes： In the insurance business； there is no statute of limitations on stupidity。
尤其有更令人振奋的一点，这些记录还包含本人之前所犯下一些重大的错误，在Mike Goldberg接手后，应该会有更好的成绩，保险往往会有一大堆让你发生错误的机会，而通常在这些机会敲门时，我都会响应，以致于经过那么多年之后，到现在我们还必须为我以前所犯的那些错误付出代