ble to those we hold in Capital Cities； Salomon； Gillette； USAir； Champion； and American Express。 We are not interested； however； in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market。
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空、冠军企业与美国运通这几个Case一样的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一点兴趣都没有。
Insurance Operations保险业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property…casualty insurance industry：
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change bined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written （％） Dividends Losses （％） GDP Deflator （％）
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990（Revised） 1991 （Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 4。4 3。2 4。4 3。1
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4 109。6 109。6 109。1
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 5。5 4。8 4。8 2。9
10。0 6。2 4。0 4。5 3。7 2。7 3。1 3。9 4。1 4。1 3。7
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 The higher the ratio； the worse the year。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107 … 111 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10％ annually； even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower。 （Over the last 25 years； incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate； 11％。） If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，（事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11％的速度在成长），若是保费收入还是大幅落后于10％的门槛，承保损失一定会继续增加。
However； the industry's tendency to under…reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time … and that could well describe the situation last year。 Though premiums did not e close to growing 10％； the bined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved。 Loss…reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that oute； and it may turn out that 1991's ratio should have been worse than was reported。 In the long run； of course； trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers。 Eventually； managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously…ill patient who tells his doctor： 〃I can't afford the operation； but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x…rays？〃
然而产业普遍存在损失准备提列不足的现象，使得企业前景不佳的情况可以获得暂时的掩饰，这正是去年度所发生的事，虽然保费收入成长不到10％，但综合比率非但没有像我所预测地那样恶化反而还有点改善，损失准备的统计资料显示这样的现象实在是相当令人怀疑，这种结果也可能导致1991年的比率将更进一步恶化，当然就长期而言，这些利用会计手法掩盖营运问题的经理人还是要面对真正的麻烦，到最后这类的经理人会变得跟许多病入膏肓的病人对医生说的一样：「我实在是承受不起另一次手术，不过你是否可以考虑把我的X光片给补一补」。
Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make bined ratios； our own or the industry's； largely irrelevant to our performance。 What counts with us is the 〃cost of funds developed from insurance；〃 or in the vernacular； 〃the cost of float。〃
于是Berkshire旗下的保险事业将与公司本身或产业经营绩效越来越不相关的综合比率做了一番修正，对我们来说真正重要的是我们从保险业所得到的资金的成本，套句行话就是浮存金的成本。
Float … which we generate in exceptional amounts … is the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss。
浮存金…我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967。
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：
（1） （2） Yearend YieldUnderwriting Approximate on Long…TermLoss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds
（承保损失） （平均浮存金） （平均资金成本） （长期公债殖利率）
（In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1991 119。6 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％
As you can see； our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U。 S。 Government's cost on newly…issued long…term bonds。 We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business； often by a wide margin。 We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold； which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory。 Our float should continue to grow； the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost。
各位可以看到我们1991年的资金成本甚至比美国政府新发行的长期公债利率还低，事实上在过去25年的保险事业经营中，我们有20年是远胜于政府公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，同时所持有的浮存金数量也以惊人的幅度成长，当然这只有在资金成本低的情况下，才称得上是好现象，展望未来，浮存金的数量还会继续成长，对我们而言，最大的挑战是这些资金是否能有合理的成本取得。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer … perhaps the largest in the world … of 〃super…cat〃 insurance； which is coverage that other insurance panies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses。 Profits in this business are enormously volatile。 As I mentioned last year； 100 million in super…cat premiums； which is roughly our annual expectation； could deliver us anything from a 100 million profit （in a year with no big catastrophe） to a 200 million loss （in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes e along）。
Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世界最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担的风险，这类保险的获利情况变化相当的大，就像是去年我曾经提过的，一亿美元的保费收入，这大约是我们预期一年所能接到的业务量，可能可以让我们有一亿美元的获利（只要当年度没有重大灾害发生），也可能让我们产生二亿美元的损失（只要当年度发生连续几个飓风或地震）。
We price this business expecting to pay out； over the long term； about 90％ of the premiums we receive。 In any given year； however； we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable。 That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe…free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years。 In effect； a one…year accounting cycle is ill…suited to the nature of this business