itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavour to save
oneself from yielding it respect。 Can it be thought that it is for any
other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our
familiar inclination； or that it is for any other reason that we all
take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own
interest well understood； but that we want to be free from the
deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such
severity？ Nevertheless； on the other hand； so little is there pain
in it that if once one has laid aside self…conceit and allowed
practical influence to that respect； he can never be satisfied with
contemplating the majesty of this law； and the soul believes itself
elevated in proportion as it sees the holy law elevated above it and
its frail nature。 No doubt great talents and activity proportioned
to them may also occasion respect or an analogous feeling。 It is
very proper to yield it to them； and then it appears as if this
sentiment were the same thing as admiration。 But if we look closer
we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the ability
is due to native talent； and how much to diligence in cultivating
it。 Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation；
and therefore as meritorious； and this notably reduces our
self…conceit； and either casts a reproach on us or urges us to
follow such an example in the way that is suitable to us。 This
respect； then； which we show to such a person （properly speaking； to
the law that his example exhibits） is not mere admiration； and this is
confirmed also by the fact that when the mon run of admirers
think they have learned from any source the badness of such a man's
character （for instance Voltaire's） they give up all respect for
him； whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with regard to
his talents； because he is himself engaged in a business and a
vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law。
Respect for the moral law is； therefore； the only and the
undoubted moral motive； and this feeling is directed to no object；
except on the ground of this law。 The moral law first determines the
will objectively and directly in the judgement of reason； and freedom；
whose causality can be determined only by the law； consists just in
this； that it restricts all inclinations； and consequently
self…esteem； by the condition of obedience to its pure law。 This
restriction now has an effect on feeling； and produces the
impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from the moral
law。 Since it is so far only a negative effect which； arising from the
influence of pure practical reason； checks the activity of the
subject； so far as it is determined by inclinations； and hence
checks the opinion of his personal worth （which； in the absence of
agreement with the moral law； is reduced to nothing）； hence； the
effect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation。 We can；
therefore； perceive this a priori； but cannot know by it the force
of the pure practical law as a motive； but only the resistance to
motives of the sensibility。 But since the same law is objectively；
that is； in the conception of pure reason； an immediate principle of
determination of the will； and consequently this humiliation takes
place only relatively to the purity of the law； hence； the lowering of
the pretensions of moral self…esteem； that is； humiliation on the
sensible side； is an elevation of the moral； i。e。； practical； esteem
for the law itself on the intellectual side； in a word； it is
respect for the law； and therefore； as its cause is intellectual； a
positive feeling which can be known a priori。 For whatever
diminishes the obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself。
Now the recognition of the moral law is the consciousness of an
activity of practical reason from objective principles； which only
fails to reveal its effect in actions because subjective
（pathological） causes hinder it。 Respect for the moral law then must
be regarded as a positive； though indirect； effect of it on feeling；
inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of
inclinations by humiliating selfesteem； and hence also as a subjective
principle of activity； that is； as a motive to obedience to the law；
and as a principle of the maxims of a life conformable to it。 From the
notion of a motive arises that of an interest； which can never be
attributed to any being unless it possesses reason； and which
signifies a motive of the will in so far as it is conceived by the
reason。 Since in a morally good will the law itself must be the
motive； the moral interest is a pure interest of practical reason
alone； independent of sense。 On the notion of an interest is based
that of a maxim。 This； therefore； is morally good only in case it
rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law。 All
three notions； however； that of a motive； of an interest； and of a
maxim； can be applied only to finite beings。 For they all suppose a
limitation of the nature of the being； in that the subjective
character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective
law of a practical reason； they suppose that the being requires to
be impelled to action by something； because an internal obstacle
opposes itself。 Therefore they cannot be applied to the Divine will。
There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the
pure moral law； apart from all advantage； as it is presented for our
obedience by practical reason； the voice of which makes even the
boldest sinner tremble and pels him to hide himself from it； that
we cannot wonder if we find this influence of a mere intellectual idea
on the feelings quite inprehensible to speculative reason and
have to be satisfied with seeing so much of this a priori that such
a feeling is inseparably connected with the conception of the moral
law in every finite rational being。 If this feeling of respect were
pathological； and therefore were a feeling of pleasure based on the
inner sense； it would be in vain to try to discover a connection of it
with any idea a priori。 But ＇it＇ is a feeling that applies merely to
what is practical； and depends on the conception of a law； simply as
to its form； not on account of any object； and therefore cannot be
reckoned either as pleasure or pain； and yet produces an interest in
obedience to the law； which we call the moral interest； just as the
capacity of taking such an interest in the law （or respect for the
moral law itself） is properly the moral feeling。
The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law； yet
bined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations；
though only by our own reason； is respect for the law。 The law that
demands this respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the
moral （for no other precludes all inclinations from exercising any
direct influence on the will）。 An action which is objectively
practical according to this law； to the exclusion of every determining
principle of inclination； is duty； and this by reason of that
exclusion includes in its concept practical obligation； that is； a
determination to actions； however reluctantly they may be done。 The
feeling that arises from the consciousness of this obligation is not
pathological； as would be a feeling produced by an object of the
senses； but practical only； that is； it is made possible by a
preceding （objective） determination of the will and a causality of the
reason。 As submission to the law； therefore； that is； as a mand
（announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject）； it contains
in it no pleasure； but on the contrary； so far； pain in the action。 On
the other hand； however； as this constraint is exercised merely by the
legislation of our own reason； it also contains something elevating；
and this subjective effect on feeling； inasmuch as pure practical
reason is the sole cause of it； may be called in this respect
self…approbation； since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto
solely by the law without any interest； and are now conscious of a
quite different interest subjectively produced thereby； and which is
purely pra