solely by the law without any interest； and are now conscious of a
quite different interest subjectively produced thereby； and which is
purely practical and free； and our taking this interest in an action
of duty is not suggested by any inclination； but is manded and
actually brought about by reason through the practical law； whence
this feeling obtains a special name； that of respect。
The notion of duty； therefore； requires in the action；
objectively； agreement with the law； and； subjectively in its maxim；
that respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is
determined thereby。 And on this rests the distinction between the
consciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty； that
is； from respect for the law。 The former （legality） is possible even
if inclinations have been the determining principles of the will；
but the latter （morality）； moral worth； can be placed only in this；
that the action is done from duty； that is； simply for the sake of the
law。*
*If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it
has been already laid down； we shall perceive that it always rests
on the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us； and that
respect； therefore。 can never have any but a moral ground； and that it
is very good and even； in a psychological point of view； very useful
for the knowledge of mankind； that whenever we use this expression
we should attend to this secret and marvellous； yet often recurring；
regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law。
It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness
in all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims；
that all the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of
acting from duty and from respect for the law； not from love and
inclination for that which the actions are to produce。 For men and all
created rational beings moral necessity is constraint； that is
obligation； and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty；
not as a proceeding previously pleasing； or likely to be Pleasing to
us of our own accord。 As if indeed we could ever bring it about that
without respect for the law； which implies fear； or at least
apprehension of transgression； we of ourselves； like the independent
Deity； could ever e into possession of holiness of will by the
coincidence of our will with the pure moral law being as it were
part of our nature； never to be shaken （in which case the law would
cease to be a mand for us； as we could never be tempted to be
untrue to it）。
The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of
holiness； but for the will of every finite rational being a law of
duty； of moral constraint； and of the determination of its actions
by respect for this law and reverence for its duty。 No other
subjective principle must be assumed as a motive； else while the
action might chance to be such as the law prescribes； yet； as does not
proceed from duty； the intention； which is the thing properly in
question in this legislation； is not moral。
It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and
from sympathetic good will； or to be just from love of order； but this
is not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to
our position amongst rational beings as men； when we pretend with
fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty； like
volunteers； and； as if we were independent on the mand； to want
to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no mand to do。
We stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not
forget our subjection to it； nor withdraw anything therefrom； or by an
egotistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law
（although our own reason gives it） so as to set the determining
principle of our will； even though the law be conformed to； anywhere
else but in the law itself and in respect for this law。 Duty and
obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the
moral law。 We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom
rendered possible by freedom； and presented to us by reason as an
object of respect； but yet we are subjects in it； not the sovereign；
and to mistake our inferior position as creatures； and
presumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law； is already to
revolt from it in spirit； even though the letter of it is fulfilled。
With this agrees very well the possibility of such a mand as：
Love God above everything； and thy neighbour as thyself。* For as a
mand it requires respect for a law which mands love and does not
leave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle。
Love to God； however； considered as an inclination （pathological
love）； is impossible； for He is not an object of the senses。 The
same affection towards men is possible no doubt； but cannot be
manded； for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at
mand； therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that
pith of all laws。 To love God means； in this sense； to like to do
His mandments； to love one's neighbour means to like to practise
all duties towards him。 But the mand that makes this a rule
cannot mand us to have this disposition in actions conformed to
duty； but only to endeavour after it。 For a mand to like to do a
thing is in itself contradictory； because if we already know of
ourselves what we are bound to do； and if further we are conscious
of liking to do it； a mand would be quite needless； and if we do it
not willingly； but only out of respect for the law； a mand that
makes this respect the motive of our maxim would directly counteract
the disposition manded。 That law of all laws； therefore； like all
the moral precepts of the Gospel； exhibits the moral disposition in
all its perfection； in which； viewed as an ideal of holiness； it is
not attainable by any creature； but yet is the pattern which we should
strive to approach； and in an uninterrupted but infinite progress
bee like to。 In fact； if a rational creature could ever reach
this point； that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws； this
would mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of
a desire that would tempt him to deviate from them； for to overe
such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore
requires self…pulsion； that is； inward constraint to something that
one does not quite like to do； and no creature can ever reach this
stage of moral disposition。 For； being a creature； and therefore
always dependent with respect to what be requires for plete
satisfaction； he can never be quite free from desires and
inclinations； and as these rest on physical causes； they can never
of themselves coincide with the moral law； the sources of which are
quite different； and therefore they make it necessary to found the
mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation； not on ready
inclination； but on respect； which demands obedience to the law；
even though one may not like it； not on love； which apprehends no
inward reluctance of the will towards the law。 Nevertheless； this
latter； namely； love to the law （which would then cease to be a
mand； and then morality； which would have passed subjectively
into holiness； would cease to be virtue） must be the constant though
unattainable goal of his endeavours。 For in the case of what we highly
esteem； but yet （on account of the consciousness of our weakness）
dread； the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most
reverential awe into inclination； and respect into love； at least this
would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law； if it
were possible for a creature to attain it。
*This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private
happiness which some make the supreme principle of morality。 This
would be expressed thus： Love thyself above everything； and God and
thy neighbour for thine own sake。
This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the
evangelical mand just cited； in order to prevent religious
fanaticism in regard to love of God； but to define accurately the
moral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men；
and to check；