accounts for his error from some bad habits； which by gradual
neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon him to such a
degree that he can regard his error as its natural consequence；
although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach which
he casts upon himself。 This is also the ground of repentance for a
long past action at every recollection of it； a painful feeling
produced by the moral sentiment； and which is practically void in so
far as it cannot serve to undo what has been done。 （Hence Priestley；
as a true and consistent fatalist； declares it absurd； and he deserves
to be mended for this candour more than those who； while they
maintain the mechanism of the will in fact； and its freedom in words
only； yet wish it to be thought that they include it in their system
of promise； although they do not explain the possibility of such
moral imputation。） But the pain is quite legitimate； because when
the law of our intelligible ＇supersensible＇ existence （the moral
law） is in question； reason recognizes no distinction of time； and
only asks whether the event belongs to me； as my act； and then
always morally connects the same feeling with it； whether it has
happened just now or long ago。 For in reference to the supersensible
consciousness of its existence （i。e。； freedom） the life of sense is
but a single phenomenon； which； inasmuch as it contains merely
manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral
law （i。e。； of the character）； must be judged not according to the
physical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon； but according
to the absolute spontaneity of freedom。 It may therefore be admitted
that； if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a
man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external
actions as to know all its motives； even the smallest； and likewise
all the external occasions that can influence them； we could calculate
a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or
solar eclipse； and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is
free。 In fact； if we were capable of a further glance； namely； an
intellectual intuition of the same subject （which indeed is not
granted to us； and instead of it we have only the rational concept）；
then we should perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard
to all that concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of
the subject as a thing in itself； of the determination of which no
physical explanation can be given。 In default of this intuition； the
moral law assures us of this distinction between the relation of our
actions as appearance to our sensible nature； and the relation of this
sensible nature to the supersensible substratum in us。 In this view；
which is natural to our reason； though inexplicable； we can also
justify some judgements which we passed with all conscientiousness；
and which yet at first sight seem quite opposed to all equity。 There
are cases in which men； even with the same education which has been
profitable to others； yet show such early depravity； and so continue
to progress in it to years of manhood； that they are thought to be
born villains； and their character altogether incapable of
improvement； and nevertheless they are judged for what they do or
leave undone； they are reproached for their faults as guilty； nay；
they themselves （the children） regard these reproaches as well
founded； exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of
mind ascribed to them； they remained just as responsible as any
other man。 This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever
springs from a man's choice （as every action intentionally performed
undoubtedly does） has as its foundation a free causality； which from
early youth expresses its character in its manifestations （i。e。；
actions）。 These； on account of the uniformity of conduct； exhibit a
natural connection； which however does not make the vicious quality of
the will necessary； but on the contrary； is the consequence of the
evil principles voluntarily adopted and unchangeable； which only
make it so much the more culpable and deserving of punishment。 There
still remains a difficulty in the bination of freedom with the
mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense； a
difficulty which； even after all the foregoing is admitted；
threatens freedom with plete destruction。 But with this danger
there is also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still
favourable to freedom； namely； that the same difficulty presses much
more strongly （in fact as we shall presently see； presses only） on the
system that holds the existence determinable in time and space to be
the existence of things in themselves； it does not therefore oblige us
to give up our capital supposition of the ideality of time as a mere
form of sensible intuition； and consequently as a mere manner of
representation which is proper to the subject as belonging to the
world of sense； and therefore it only requires that this view be
reconciled with this idea。
The difficulty is as follows： Even if it is admitted that the
supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action；
although； as a subject also belonging to the world of sense； he is
under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action； still； as
soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause
of the existence of substance （a proposition which can never be
given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the
Being of all beings； and therewith giving up his all sufficiency； on
which everything in theology depends）； it seems as if we must admit
that a man's actions have their determining principle in something
which is wholly out of his power… namely； in the causality of a
Supreme Being distinct from himself and on whom his own existence
and the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent。
In point of fact； if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications
in time were not merely modifications of him as appearance； but as a
thing in itself； freedom could not be saved。 Man would be a marionette
or an automaton； like Vaucanson's； prepared and wound up by the
Supreme Artist。 Self…consciousness would indeed make him a thinking
automaton； but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be
mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom； and it would
deserve this name only in a parative sense； since； although the
proximate determining causes of its motion and a long series of
their determining causes are internal； yet the last and highest is
found in a foreign hand。 Therefore I do not see how those who still
insist on regarding time and space as attributes belonging to the
existence of things in themselves； can avoid admitting the fatality of
actions； or if （like the otherwise acute Mendelssohn） they allow
them to be conditions necessarily belonging to the existence of finite
and derived beings； but not to that of the infinite Supreme Being； I
do not see on what ground they can justify such a distinction； or；
indeed； how they can avoid the contradiction that meets them； when
they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily belonging
to finite things in themselves； whereas God is the cause of this
existence； but cannot be the cause of time （or space） itself （since
this must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the
existence of things）； and consequently as regards the existence of
these things。 His causality must be subject to conditions and even
to the condition of time； and this would inevitably bring in
everything contradictory to the notions of His infinity and
independence。 On the other hand； it is quite easy for us to draw the
distinction between the attribute of the divine existence of being
independent on all time…conditions； and that of a being of the world
of sense； the distinction being that between the existence of a
being in itself and that of a thing in appearance。 Hence； if this
ideality of time and space is not adopted； nothing remains but
Spinozism； in which space and time are essential attributes of the
Supreme Being Himself； and the things dependent on Him （ourselves；