master in the knowledge of wisdom； which implies more than a modest
man would claim for himself。 Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would
always remain an ideal； which objectively is presented plete in
reason alone； while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of
his unceasing endeavours； and no one would be justified in
professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of
philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his
own person as an example （in his self…mastery and the unquestioned
interest that he takes pre…eminently in the general good）； and this
the ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable
title。
We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the
dialectic of the pure practical reason； on the point of the definition
of the summum bonum （a successful solution of which dialectic would
lead us to expect； as in case of that of the theoretical reason； the
most beneficial effects； inasmuch as the self…contradictions of pure
practical reason honestly stated； and not concealed； force us to
undertake a plete critique of this faculty）。
The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will。
But since this is merely formal （viz。； as prescribing only the form of
the maxim as universally legislative）； it abstracts as a determining
principle from all matter that is to say； from every object of
volition。 Hence； though the summum bonum may be the whole object of
a pure practical reason； i。e。； a pure will； yet it is not on that
account to be regarded as its determining principle； and the moral law
alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its
realization or promotion are aimed at。 This remark is important in
so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles； where the
slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds。 For it will have
been seen from the Analytic that； if we assume any object under the
name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the
moral law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle；
this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral
principle。
It is； however； evident that if the notion of the summum bonum
includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition； then the
summum bonum would not merely be an object； but the notion of it and
the conception of its existence as possible by our own practical
reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will；
since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law
which is already included in this conception； and by no other
object； as the principle of autonomy requires。 This order of the
conceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of； as
otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we had fallen
into a contradiction； while everything remains in perfect harmony。
CHAPTER II。 Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the
Conception of the 〃Summum Bonum〃。
The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which
might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it。 The
summum may mean either the supreme （supremum） or the perfect
（consummatum）。 The former is that condition which is itself
unconditioned； i。e。； is not subordinate to any other （originarium）；
the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the
same kind （perfectissimum）。 It has been shown in the Analytic that
virtue （as worthiness to be happy） is the supreme condition of all
that can appear to us desirable； and consequently of all our pursuit
of happiness； and is therefore the supreme good。 But it does not
follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the
desires of rational finite beings； for this requires happiness also；
and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes
himself an end； but even in the judgement of an impartial reason；
which regards persons in general as ends in themselves。 For to need
happiness； to deserve it； and yet at the same time not to
participate in it； cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a
rational being possessed at the same time of all power； if； for the
sake of experiment； we conceive such a being。 Now inasmuch as virtue
and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum
in a person； and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion
to morality （which is the worth of the person； and his worthiness to
be happy） constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world； hence this
summum bonum expresses the whole； the perfect good； in which； however；
virtue as the condition is always the supreme good； since it has no
condition above it； whereas happiness； while it is pleasant to the
possessor of it； is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good；
but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition。
When two elements are necessarily united in one concept； they must
be connected as reason and consequence； and this either so that
their unity is considered as analytical （logical connection）； or as
synthetical （real connection） the former following the law of
identity； the latter that of causality。 The connection of virtue and
happiness may therefore be understood in two ways： either the
endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not
two distinct actions； but absolutely identical； in which case no maxim
need be made the principle of the former； other than what serves for
the latter； or the connection consists in this； that virtue produces
happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue； as a
cause produces an effect。
The ancient Greek schools were； properly speaking； only two； and
in determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in
fact one and the same method； inasmuch as they did not allow virtue
and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum
bonum； and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the
rule of identity； but they differed as to which of the two was to be
taken as the fundamental notion。 The Epicurean said： 〃To be
conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue〃； the Stoic
said： 〃To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness。〃 With the former；
Prudence was equivalent to morality； with the latter； who chose a
higher designation for virtue； morality alone was true wisdom。
While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all
imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy； we must at
the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied
in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous
notions； those of happiness and virtue。 But it agrees with the
dialectical spirit of their times （and subtle minds are even now
sometimes misled in the same way） to get rid of irreconcilable
differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest
about words； and thus apparently working out the identity of the
notion under different names； and this usually occurs in cases where
the bination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high；
or would require so plete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
in the rest of the philosophical system； that men are afraid to
penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as
a difference in questions of form。
While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness； they were not agreed as to the way
in which they tried to force this identity； but were separated
infinitely from one another； the one placing its principle on the side
of sense； the other on that of reason； the one in the consciousness of
sensible wants； the other in the independence of practical reason on
all sensible grounds of determination。 According to the Epicurean； the
notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim： 〃To promote
one's own happiness〃； according to the Stoics； on the other hand；
the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of
virtue。 Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical
with part of the containing notion； but not with the whole； and
moreover two wholes m