day who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles； fell into
the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons
for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue （and indeed the
upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his
uprightness； since with such a character the reproach that his habit
of thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of
transgression and his moral self…condemnation would rob him of all
enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise
contain）。 But the question is： How is such a disposition possible in
the first instance； and such a habit of thought in estimating the
worth of one's existence； since prior to it there can be in the
subject no feeling at all for moral worth？ If a man is virtuous
without being conscious of his integrity in every action； he will
certainly not enjoy life； however favourable fortune may be to him
in its physical circumstances； but can we make him virtuous in the
first instance； in other words； before he esteems the moral worth of
his existence so highly； by praising to him the peace of mind that
would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has
no sense？
On the other hand； however； there is here an occasion of a vitium
subreptionis； and as it were of an optical illusion； in the
self…consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one
feels… an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether
avoid。 The moral disposition of mind is necessarily bined with a
consciousness that the will is determined directly by the law。 Now the
consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always
the source of a satisfaction in the resulting action； but this
pleasure； this satisfaction in oneself； is not the determining
principle of the action； on the contrary； the determination of the
will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure；
and this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the
faculty of desire。 Now as this determination has exactly the same
effect within in impelling to activity； that a feeling of the pleasure
to be expected from the desired action would have had； we easily
look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively
feel； and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse； just as it
happens in the so…called illusion of the senses （in this case the
inner sense）。 It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined
to actions immediately by a purely rational law； sublime even is the
illusion that regards the subjective side of this capacity of
intellectual determination as something sensible and the effect of a
special sensible feeling （for an intellectual feeling would be a
contradiction）。 It is also of great importance to attend to this
property of our personality and as much as possible to cultivate the
effect of reason on this feeling。 But we must beware lest by falsely
extolling this moral determining principle as a spring； making its
source lie in particular feelings of pleasure （which are in fact
only results）； we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring； the
law itself； by putting as it were a false foil upon it。 Respect； not
pleasure or enjoyment of happiness； is something for which it is not
possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its
foundation （for this would always be sensible and pathological）； and
consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by
no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure； although in relation to
the faculty of desire it produces the same effect； but from
different sources： it is only by this mode of conception； however；
that we can attain what we are seeking； namely； that actions be done
not merely in accordance with duty （as a result of pleasant feelings）；
but from duty； which must be the true end of all moral cultivation。
Have we not； however； a word which does not express enjoyment； as
happiness does； but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence； an
analogue of the happiness which must necessarily acpany the
consciousness of virtue？ Yes this word is self…contentment which in
its proper signification always designates only a negative
satisfaction in one's existence； in which one is conscious of
needing nothing。 Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of
following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence
of inclinations； at least as motives determining （though not as
affecting） our desire； and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in
following my moral maxims； it is the only source of an unaltered
contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no
special feeling。 This may be called intellectual contentment。 The
sensible contentment （improperly so…called） which rests on the
satisfaction of the inclinations； however delicate they may be
imagined to be； can never be adequate to the conception of it。 For the
inclinations change； they grow with the indulgence shown them； and
always leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to
fill。 Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being； and；
although he cannot lay them aside； they wrest from him the wish to
be rid of them。 Even an inclination to what is right （e。g。； to
beneficence）； though it may much facilitate the efficacy of the
moral maxims； cannot produce any。 For in these all must be directed to
the conception of the law as a determining principle； if the action is
to contain morality and not merely legality。 Inclination is blind
and slavish； whether it be of a good sort or not； and； when morality
is in question； reason must not play the part merely of guardian to
inclination； but disregarding it altogether must attend simply to
its own interest as pure practical reason。 This very feeling of
passion and tender sympathy； if it precedes the deliberation on the
question of duty and bees a determining principle； is even annoying
to right thinking persons； brings their deliberate maxims into
confusion； and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be
subject to lawgiving reason alone。
From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of
a pure practical reason produces by action （virtue） a consciousness of
mastery over one's inclinations； and therefore of independence of
them； and consequently also of the discontent that always
acpanies them； and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state；
i。e。； contentment； which is primarily contentment with one's own
person。 Freedom itself bees in this way （namely； indirectly）
capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness； because it
does not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling； nor is it；
strictly speaking； bliss； since it does not include plete
independence of inclinations and wants； but it resembles bliss in so
far as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free
from their influence； and thus； at least in its origin； this enjoyment
is analogous to the self…sufficiency which we can ascribe only to
the Supreme Being。
From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason； it
follows that in practical principles we may at least conceive as
possible a natural and necessary connection between the
consciousness of morality and the expectation of a proportionate
happiness as its result； though it does not follow that we can know or
perceive this connection； that； on the other hand； principles of the
pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality； that；
therefore； morality is the supreme good （as the first condition of the
summum bonum）； while happiness constitutes its second element； but
only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned； but necessary
consequence of the former。 Only with this subordination is the
summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason； which must
necessarily conceive it as possible； since it mands us to
contribute to the utmost of our power to its realization。 But since
the possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its
condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things and
cannot be given according to the laws of the world of sense；
although