with the moral law in the summum bonum； which is the whole end of
practical reason。 2。 It leads to that of which speculative reason
contained nothing but antinomy； the solution of which it could only
found on a notion Problematically conceivable indeed； but whose
objective reality it could not prove or determine； namely； the
cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of
our existence in it； by means of the postulate of freedom （the reality
of which it lays down by virtue of the moral law）； and with it
likewise the law of an intelligible world； to which speculative reason
could only point； but could not define its conception。 3。 What
speculative reason was able to think； but was obliged to leave
undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal； viz。； the theological
conception of the first Being； to this it gives significance （in a
practical view； that is； as a condition of the possibility of the
object of a will determined by that law）； namely； as the supreme
principle of the summum bonum in an intelligible world； by means of
moral legislation in it invested with sovereign power。
Is our knowledge； however； actually extended in this way by pure
practical reason； and is that immanent in practical reason which for
the speculative was only transcendent？ Certainly； but only in a
practical point of view。 For we do not thereby take knowledge of the
nature of our souls； nor of the intelligible world； nor of the Supreme
Being； with respect to what they are in themselves； but we have merely
bined the conceptions of them in the practical concept of the
summum bonum as the object of our will； and this altogether a
priori； but only by means of the moral law； and merely in reference to
it； in respect of the object which it mands。 But how freedom is
possible； and how we are to conceive this kind of causality
theoretically and positively； is not thereby discovered； but only that
there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in its
behoof。 It is the same with the remaining ideas； the possibility of
which no human intelligence will ever fathom； but the truth of
which； on the other hand； no sophistry will ever wrest from the
conviction even of the monest man。
VII。 How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure
Reason in a Practical point of view； without its
Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at
the same time？
In order not to be too abstract； we will answer this question at
once in its application to the present case。 In order to extend a pure
cognition practically； there must be an a priori purpose given； that
is； an end as object （of the will）； which independently of all
theological principle is presented as practically necessary by an
imperative which determines the will directly （a categorical
imperative）； and in this case that is the summum bonum。 This； however；
is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions
（for which； because they are mere conceptions of pure reason； no
corresponding intuition can be found； nor consequently by the path
of theory any objective reality）； namely； freedom； immortality； and
God。 Thus by the practical law which mands the existence of the
highest good possible in a world； the possibility of those objects
of pure speculative reason is postulated； and the objective reality
which the latter could not assure them。 By this the theoretical
knowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession； but it
consists only in this； that those concepts which otherwise it had to
look upon as problematical （merely thinkable） concepts； are now
shown assertorially to be such as actually have objects； because
practical reason indispensably requires their existence for the
possibility of its object； the summum bonum； which practically is
absolutely necessary； and this justifies theoretical reason in
assuming them。 But this extension of theoretical reason is no
extension of speculative； that is； we cannot make any positive use
of it in a theoretical point of view。 For as nothing is acplished
in this by practical reason； further than that these concepts are real
and actually have their （possible） objects； and nothing in the way
of intuition of them is given thereby （which indeed could not be
demanded）； hence the admission of this reality does not render any
synthetical proposition possible。 Consequently； this discovery does
not in the least help us to extend this knowledge of ours in a
speculative point of view； although it does in respect of the
practical employment of pure reason。 The above three ideas of
speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions； they are
however （transcendent） thoughts； in which there is nothing impossible。
Now； by help of an apodeictic practical law； being necessary
conditions of that which it mands to be made an object； they
acquire objective reality； that is； we learn from it that they have
objects； without being able to point out how the conception of them is
related to an object； and this； too； is still not a cognition of these
objects； for we cannot thereby form any synthetical judgement about
them； nor determine their application theoretically； consequently；
we can make no theoretical rational use of them at all； in which use
all speculative knowledge of reason consists。 Nevertheless； the
theoretical knowledge； not indeed of these objects； but of reason
generally； is so far enlarged by this； that by the practical
postulates objects were given to those ideas； a merely problematical
thought having by this means first acquired objective reality。 There
is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given supersensible
objects； but an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge
in respect of the supersensible generally； inasmuch as it is pelled
to admit that there are such objects； although it is not able to
define them more closely； so as itself to extend this knowledge of the
objects （which have now been given it on practical grounds； and only
for practical use）。 For this accession； then； pure theoretical reason；
for which all those ideas are transcendent and without object； has
simply to thank its practical faculty。 In this they bee immanent
and constitutive； being the source of the possibility of realizing the
necessary object of pure practical reason （the summum bonum）；
whereas apart from this they are transcendent； and merely regulative
principles of speculative reason； which do not require it to assume
a new object beyond experience； but only to bring its use in
experience nearer to pleteness。 But when once reason is in
possession of this accession； it will go to work with these ideas as
speculative reason （properly only to assure the certainty of its
practical use） in a negative manner： that is； not extending but
clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off
anthropomorphism； as the source of superstition； or seeming
extension of these conceptions by supposed experience； and on the
other side fanaticism； which promises the same by means of
supersensible intuition or feelings of the like kind。 All these are
hindrances to the practical use of pure reason； so that the removal of
them may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a
practical point of view； without contradicting the admission that
for speculative purposes reason has not in the least gained by this。
Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure
concepts of the understanding （categories）； without which no object
can be conceived。 These can be applied to the theoretical employment
of reason； i。e。； to that kind of knowledge； only in case an
intuition （which is always sensible） is taken as a basis； and
therefore merely in order to conceive by means of… them an object of
possible experience。 Now here what have to be thought by means of
the categories in order to be known are ideas of reason； which
cannot be given in any experience。 Only we are not here concerned with
the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these ideas； but only with
this； whether they have objects at all。 This reality is supplied by
pure practical reason； and theoretical reason has no