prove the objective validity of a judgement （i。e。； its validity as a
cognition）； and although this universal assent should accidentally
happen； it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object； on the
contrary； it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the
basis of a necessary universal consent。
Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal
empiricism； for； as is well known； he desired nothing more than
that； instead of ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in
the concept of cause； a merely subjective one should be assumed； viz。；
custom； in order to deny that reason could judge about God； freedom；
and immortality； and if once his principles were granted； he was
certainly well able to deduce his conclusions therefrom； with all
logical coherence。 But even Hume did not make his empiricism so
universal as to include mathematics。 He holds the principles of
mathematics to be analytical； and if his were correct； they would
certainly be apodeictic also： but we could not infer from this that
reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in
philosophy also… that is to say； those which are synthetical
judgements； like the judgement of causality。 But if we adopt a
universal empiricism； then mathematics will be included。
Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits
only empirical principles； as it inevitably is in the antinomy in
which mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space； which
empiricism cannot admit； then the greatest possible evidence of
demonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged
conclusions from experience； and we are driven to ask； like
Cheselden's blind patient； 〃Which deceives me； sight or touch？〃 （for
empiricism is based on a necessity felt； rationalism on a necessity
seen）。 And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute
scepticism。 It is erroneous to attribute this in such an unqualified
sense to Hume；* since he left at least one certain touchstone （which
can only be found in a priori principles）； although experience
consists not only of feelings； but also of judgements。
*Names that designate the followers of a sect have always been
acpanied with much injustice； just as if one said； 〃N is an
Idealist。〃 For although he not only admits； but even insists； that our
ideas of external things have actual objects of external things
corresponding to them； yet he holds that the form of the intuition
does not depend on them but on the human mind。
However； as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism
can scarcely be serious； and it is probably put forward only as an
intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer
light； by contrast； the necessity of rational a priori principles；
we can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this
otherwise uninstructive labour。
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION。
Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason。
The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the
cognitive faculty only； and a critical examination of it with
reference to this use applied properly only to the pure faculty of
cognition； because this raised the suspicion； which was afterwards
confirmed； that it might easily pass beyond its limits； and be lost
among unattainable objects； or even contradictory notions。 It is quite
different with the practical use of reason。 In this； reason is
concerned with the grounds of determination of the will； which is a
faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas； or to
determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects （whether the
physical power is sufficient or not）； that is； to determine our
causality。 For here； reason can at least attain so far as to determine
the will； and has always objective reality in so far as it is the
volition only that is in question。 The first question here then is
whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will； or
whether it can be a ground of determination only as dependent on
empirical conditions。 Now； here there es in a notion of causality
justified by the critique of the pure reason； although not capable
of being presented empirically； viz。； that of freedom； and if we can
now discover means of proving that this property does in fact belong
to the human will （and so to the will of all rational beings）； then it
will not only be shown that pure reason can be practical； but that
it alone； and not reason empirically limited； is indubitably
practical； consequently； we shall have to make a critical examination；
not of pure practical reason； but only of practical reason
generally。 For when once pure reason is shown to exist； it needs no
critical examination。 For reason itself contains the standard for
the critical examination of every use of it。 The critique； then； of
practical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically
conditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground
of determination of the will。 If it is proved that there is a
＇practical＇ reason； its employment is alone immanent； the
empirically conditioned use； which claims supremacy； is on the
contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and precepts
which go quite beyond its sphere。 This is just the opposite of what
might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment。
However； as it is still pure reason； the knowledge of which is
here the foundation of its practical employment； the general outline
of the classification of a critique of practical reason must be
arranged in accordance with that of the speculative。 We must； then；
have the Elements and the Methodology of it； and in the former an
Analytic as the rule of truth； and a Dialectic as the exposition and
dissolution of the illusion in the judgements of practical reason。 But
the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of
that in the critique of the pure speculative reason。 For； in the
present case； we shall mence with the principles and proceed to the
concepts； and only then； if possible； to the senses； whereas in the
case of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end
with the principles。 The reason of this lies again in this： that now
we have to do with a will； and have to consider reason； not in its
relation to objects； but to this will and its causality。 We must；
then； begin with the principles of a causality not empirically
conditioned； after which the attempt can be made to establish our
notions of the determining grounds of such a will； of their
application to objects； and finally to the subject and its sense
faculty。 We necessarily begin with the law of causality from
freedom； that is； with a pure practical principle； and this determines
the objects to which alone it can be applied。
FIRST PART。
ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON。
BOOK I。 The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason。
CHAPTER I。 Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason。
I。 DEFINITION。
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general
determination of the will； having under it several practical rules。
They are subjective； or maxims； when the condition is regarded by
the subject as valid only for his own will； but are objective； or
practical laws； when the condition is recognized as objective； that
is； valid for the will of every rational being。
REMARK。
Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive；
that is； one adequate to determine the will； then there are
practical laws； otherwise all practical principles will be mere
maxims。 In case the will of a rational being is pathologically
affected； there may occur a conflict of the maxims with the
practical laws recognized by itself。 For example； one may make it
his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged； and yet he may see that
this is not a practical law； but only his own maxim； that； on the
contrary； regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the
will of every rational being； it must contradict itself。 In natural
philosophy the principles of what happens； e。g。； the principle