reason in contrast to ideas of sense； yet the feeling of pleasure；
by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the
will （the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the
production of the object）； is of one and the same kind； not only
inasmuch as it can only be known empirically； but also inasmuch as
it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in
the faculty of desire； and in this respect can only differ in degree
from every other ground of determination。 Otherwise； how could we
pare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination； the
ideas of which depend upon different faculties； so as to prefer that
which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree。 The same
man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again
obtain； in order not to miss a hunt； he may depart in the midst of a
fine speech； in order not to be late for dinner； he may leave a
rational conversation； such as he otherwise values highly； to take his
place at the gaming…table； he may even repulse a poor man whom he at
other times takes pleasure in benefiting； because he has only just
enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre。 If
the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the
agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause； it
is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected。
The only thing that concerns him； in order to decide his choice； is；
how great； how long continued； how easily obtained； and how often
repeated； this agreeableness is。 just as to the man who wants money to
spend； it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain
or washed out of the sand； provided it is everywhere accepted at the
same value； so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does
not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses；
but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the
longest time。 It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason
the power of determining the will； without the presupposition of any
feeling； who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to
describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously
brought under one and the same principle。 Thus； for example； it is
observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power； in
the consciousness of our strength of mind in overing obstacles
which are opposed to our designs； in the culture of our mental
talents； etc。； and we justly call these more refined pleasures and
enjoyments； because they are more in our power than others； they do
not wear out； but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment
of them； and while they delight they at the same time cultivate。 But
to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way
and not through sense； whereas the possibility of the pleasure
presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us； which is the first
condition of this satisfaction； this is just as when ignorant
persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle；
so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it； and
then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual
and yet extended being。 If with Epicurus we make virtue determine
the will only by means of the pleasure it promises； we cannot
afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same
kind as those of the coarsest senses。 For we have no reason whatever
to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is
excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses。 As far as can be
conjectured； he sought the source of many of them in the use of the
higher cognitive faculty； but this did not prevent him； and could
not prevent him； from holding on the principle above stated； that
the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us； and by
which alone they can determine the will； is just of the same kind。
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher； and yet the
most rarely found。 The ancient Greek schools give us more examples
of it than we find in our syncretistic age； in which a certain shallow
and dishonest system of promise of contradictory principles is
devised； because it mends itself better to a public which is
content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly； so
as to please every party。
The principle of private happiness； however much understanding and
reason may be used in it； cannot contain any other determining
principles for the will than those which belong to the lower
desires； and either there are no ＇higher＇ desires at all； or pure
reason must of itself alone be practical； that is； it must be able
to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without
supposing any feeling； and consequently without any idea of the
pleasant or unpleasant； which is the matter of the desire； and which
is always an empirical condition of the principles。 Then only； when
reason of itself determines the will （not as the servant of the
inclination）； it is really a higher desire to which that which is
pathologically determined is subordinate； and is really； and even
specifically； distinct from the latter； so that even the slightest
admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and
superiority； just as in a mathematical demonstration the least
empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value。
Reason； with its practical law； determines the will immediately； not
by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain； not even of
pleasure in the law itself； and it is only because it can； as pure
reason； be practical； that it is possible for it to be legislative。
REMARK II。
To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational
being； and this； therefore； is inevitably a determining principle of
its faculty of desire。 For we are not in possession originally of
satisfaction with our whole existence… a bliss which would imply a
consciousness of our own independent self…sufficiency this is a
problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature； because we have
wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires； that is；
something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or
pain； which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with
our condition。 But just because this material principle of
determination can only be empirically known by the subject； it is
impossible to regard this problem as a law； for a law being
objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the
will in all cases and for all rational beings。 For； although the
notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical
relation of the objects to the desires； yet it is only a general
name for the subjective determining principles； and determines nothing
specifically； whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this
practical problem； which cannot be solved at all without such specific
determination。 For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure
and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness； and even
in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants
according as this feeling changes； and thus a law which is
subjectively necessary （as a law of nature） is objectively a very
contingent practical principle； which can and must be very different
in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law； since； in
the desire for happiness it is not the form （of conformity to law）
that is decisive； but simply the matter； namely； whether I am to
expect pleasure in following the law； and how much。 Principles of
self…love may； indeed； contain universal precepts of skill （how to
find means to acplish one's purpose）； but in that case they are
merely theoretical principles；* as； for example； how he who would like
to eat bread should contrive a mill； but practical precepts founded on
them can never be universal； for the determining principle of the
desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain； which can never be
supposed to be universally directed to the same objects。
*Propositions which in mathematics or